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Articles 1 - 30 of 57
Full-Text Articles in Business Administration, Management, and Operations
The Supreme Court And The Pro-Business Paradox, Elizabeth Pollman
The Supreme Court And The Pro-Business Paradox, Elizabeth Pollman
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One of the most notable trends of the Roberts Court is expanding corporate rights and narrowing liability or access to justice against corporate defendants. This Comment examines recent Supreme Court cases to highlight this “pro-business” pattern as well as its contradictory relationship with counter trends in corporate law and governance. From Citizens United to Americans for Prosperity, the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence could ironically lead to a situation in which it has protected corporate political spending based on a view of the corporation as an “association of citizens,” but allows constitutional scrutiny to block actual participants from getting information about …
Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo
Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo
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My colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is almost universally recognized as the most cited and the most authoritative US antitrust scholar. Among his many honors, his status as the senior author of the authoritative Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise makes him the unquestioned leader of the New Harvard School, which has long served as the bellwether for how courts are likely to resolve emerging issues in modern antitrust doctrine. Unfortunately, its defining tenets and its positions on emerging issues remain surprisingly obscure. My contribution to this festschrift explores the core commitments that distinguish the New Harvard School from other approaches to antitrust. It …
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
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In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting.
The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic model that focuses on one problem only, management agency costs. With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and information asymmetries. General equilibrium theory (GE) provides that lens. Several lessons follow from reference to this higher-order …
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.
Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring …
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
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The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, …
Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
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This article seeks to frame a short statement of purpose for corporate law on which all reasonable observers can agree. The statement, in order to succeed at its intended purpose, must satisfy two strict conditions: first, it must have enough content to be meaningful; second, it must be completely uncontroversial, both descriptively and normatively. The exercise, thus described, involves avoiding the issues that occupy center stage in discussions about corporate law while at the same time highlighting the discussants’ generally held presuppositions. Three closely interconnected issues arise. First, whether the statement of the purpose of corporate law should speak in …
Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, Lisa Fairfax
Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, Lisa Fairfax
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This Article not only argues that corporations must be encouraged to enhance the level of communication between shareholders and the board, but also maintains that the benefits of increased engagement are significant enough that we should consider developing standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust board-shareholder engagement for corporations that fail to respond to such encouragement. In the last several years, shareholders not only have gained increased authority over corporate elections and governance matters, but also have demonstrated a willingness to use that authority to challenge, and even reject, management policies and practices. Shareholders also have begun to demand …
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
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This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article insists that such rejection …
Managing Expectations: Does The Directors' Duty To Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, Lisa Fairfax
Managing Expectations: Does The Directors' Duty To Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, Lisa Fairfax
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This article grapples with whether we are expecting too much from the duty of oversight. The directors’ oversight duty refers to directors’ responsibility to actively monitor corporate officers, employees, and corporate affairs. Directors breach their oversight duty when officers and employees engage in wrongdoing that causes harm to the corporation and that wrongdoing can be attributed to directors’ failure to monitor. In other words, oversight liability holds directors liable for their failure to act under circumstances where it can be proven that directors should have acted and their actions could have prevented corporate harm.
The significance of directors’ oversight duty …
The Destructive Ambiguity Of Federal Proxy Access, Jill E. Fisch
The Destructive Ambiguity Of Federal Proxy Access, Jill E. Fisch
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After almost seventy years of debate, on August 25, 2010, the SEC adopted a federal proxy access rule. This Article examines the new rule and concludes that, despite the prolonged rule-making effort, the new rule is ambiguous in its application and unlikely to increase shareholder input into the composition of corporate boards. More troubling is the SEC’s ambiguous justification for its rule which is neither grounded in state law nor premised on a normative vision of the appropriate role of shareholder nominations in corporate governance. Although the federal proxy access rule drew an unprecedented number of comment letters and is …
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Product Life Cycle Theory And The Maturation Of The Internet, Christopher S. Yoo
Product Life Cycle Theory And The Maturation Of The Internet, Christopher S. Yoo
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Much of the recent debate over Internet policy has focused on the permissibility of business practices that are becoming increasingly common, such as new forms of network management, prioritization, pricing, and strategic partnerships. This Essay analyzes these developments through the lens of the management literature on the product life cycle, dominant designs, technological trajectories and design hierarchies, and the role of complementary assets in determining industry structure. This analysis suggests that many of these business practices may represent nothing more than a reflection of how the nature of competition changes as industries mature. This in turn suggests that network neutrality …
The Non-Management Side Of Academic Administration, Michael A. Fitts
The Non-Management Side Of Academic Administration, Michael A. Fitts
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No abstract provided.
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Unentrapped, William W. Bratton
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
The Managerial Turn In Environmental Policy, Cary Coglianese
The Managerial Turn In Environmental Policy, Cary Coglianese
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No abstract provided.
Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch
Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch
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The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q.
This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to judge corporate …
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.
Management-Based Strategies For Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance, Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash
Management-Based Strategies For Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance, Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash
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Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on changes in private sector management. In recognition of this fact, government and industry have begun in recent years to focus directly on shaping the internal management practices of private firms. New management-based strategies can take many forms, but unlike conventional regulatory approaches they are linked by their distinctive focus on management practices, rather than on environmental technologies or emissions targets. This article offers the first sustained analysis of both public and private sector initiatives designed specifically to improve firms' environmental management. Synthesizing the results of a conference of leading scholars and …
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.
Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay For Bill Klein, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay For Bill Klein, David A. Skeel Jr.
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No abstract provided.
The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey
The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey
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Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government …
The Past, Present And Future Of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, David A. Skeel Jr.
The Past, Present And Future Of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, David A. Skeel Jr.
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Chapter 11's distinctive post-petition financing rules trace their ancestry back to the origins of large scale corporate reorganization in America in the nineteenth century. In this sense, post-petition financing has always been with us. But in the past decade, the role of the financers has changed. After a century in the shadows, post-petition lenders have stepped onto center stage. The DIP loan agreement has become the single most important governance lever in many large Chapter 11 cases. Why have these formerly bashful financers suddenly started hogging the spotlight? I argue in this article that the generous terms offered to DIP …
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
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Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.
This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
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The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love The Pill: Adaptive Responses To Takeover Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love The Pill: Adaptive Responses To Takeover Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.