Business Commons^™

Essays On Reit Founder Ceos, Michael Mcgonigle

Open Access Theses & Dissertations

I explore how founder CEOs influence the firm. In my first chapter I examine how founderCEO risk-aversion affects firm capital structure. Using book and market leverage ratios to proxy for risk aversion, I show that REITs with founder CEOs have less leverage than other REITs. This result holds when controlling for firm size, firm age, tangibility, profitability, growth potential, diversification strategy, property-type fixed effects and year fixed effects. I use a propensity score matching methodology to examine whether the reduced leverage is due to factors other than a CEO's founder status. The results do not support that notion. I use …

Do Ceo Gratification Preferences Influence Accounting Choices Near Retirement?, Nicholas Wilson

College of Business: Dissertations, Theses, and Student Research

CEOs near retirement are less motivated to act in shareholders' best interests than those planning to remain indefinitely; this is the horizon problem. Financial reporting that personifies the horizon problem includes an abrupt reduction in discretionary spending and an increase in current accounting earnings; this abrupt change in reporting is potentially detrimental to long-term gains. Gratification preference, defined by observable tendencies, is a personal characteristic reflecting one's prior life experiences and environments. This study offers an archival measure of these gratification preferences and examines whether these preferences mitigate or exacerbate the CEO horizon problem. The results suggest that discretionary accounting …

California Senate Bill 826: Implications On Female Executive Compensation And Representation, Elizabeth Ann Dion

Honors Theses and Capstones

In 2018, the State of California passed Senate Bill 826, requiring that all public companies headquartered within the state have at least one female on the board of directors. Prior literature has identified a significant connection between female board representation and the impact on female executives and their pay. The prominence of female leaders has been shown to enable fellow females to pursue leadership positions. In addition, prior studies have found that female board members have encouraged an increase in female executives, and an increase in female executive pay has been identified due to the role of the board in …

Cfo Compensation And Public Company Audit Fees: A Study Of Relationships And Influence On Audit Pricing, Charles T. Fagan

Doctoral Dissertations (DBA)

From the Introduction:

In corporate America, most executives have multiple forms of compensation ranging from a base salary, which is fixed, to annual and multi-year bonuses, which are normally tied to some performance based metrics; to longer-term incentives such as stock options, stock grants, restricted stock units (RSUs) and other forms of equity-based compensation. Aside from a base salary within normal ranges, all other forms of compensation are normally meant to incentify an executives’ behavior to work in the best interest of the company and its shareholders. At least, that is the theory on incentive-based compensation.

It is quite common …

The Impact Of Ceo Compensation Incentives On Financial Reporting Choices: Evidence From Potential Ghost Revenues Created In Mergers And Acquisitions, Jason A. Ashby

Doctoral Dissertations

When an acquirer purchases a target and assumes the target’s deferred revenue liability, accounting standards codification 805 requires that the acquirer recognize the target’s deferred revenue at its estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. If the target’s deferred revenue book value exceeds its fair value, the portion of deferred revenue written down will never be recognized as revenue for the acquirer under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). In this study, I investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) compensation incentives on the fair value measurement of deferred revenue liabilities in acquisitions. If a larger proportion of CEO …

The Impact Of Corporate Reputation Ratings On Ceo Compensation Under Diverse Economic Conditions, Joel Rudin, Jooh Lee

Rohrer College of Business Faculty Scholarship

Although it is assumed that CEOs attempt to use corporate reputation ratings to justify increases in their annual compensation, controversy persists on the relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation. Based on agency theory and signaling theory, we predict a positive relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation but only during periods of economic recovery. Using a subset of Fortune’s “Most Admired” companies, this study demonstrates that corporate reputation ratings are signifcantly associated with CEO compensation during periods of economic recovery but not during periods of economic recession, after controlling the potential extraneous factors that may infuence CEO …

Organizational Responses To Say-On-Pay Votes: Results Of The 2021 Hr@Moore Survey Of Chros, Donald J. Schepker, Patrick M. Wright, Anthony J. Nyberg, Sam Strizver

Reports

"Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, US publicly traded companies subject to proxy rules must allow shareholders to submit an advisory vote on the compensation of their most highly compensated executives at least every three years (known as Say-on-Pay votes), and on how often shareholders would like to be presented with Say-on-Pay votes. Given the potential interplay between executive compensation and succession planning, as illustrated in recent Center for Executive Succession research that shows executive compensation and executive succession decisions appear to be related when it comes to the selection of internal CEO appointments, we sought to …

Cfo Promotion-Based Incentives And Earnings Management, Ruonan Liu, Steve Lin, Changjiang Wang

Eberhardt School of Business Faculty Articles

This study examines whether CFO promotion-based incentives induce opportunistic reporting activities. We find that CFO promotion-based incentives, measured by the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, are positively associated with accruals management and accounting misconduct in the pre-SOX period and the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Further analysis shows that CFO promotion-based incentives are negatively associated with real earnings management in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. In addition, we find some evidence that the association between CFO promotion-based incentives and opportunistic reporting activities is stronger before CEO turnovers. …

Executive Portfolio Diversification Through Dividends, Janette Goodridge

All Graduate Plan B and other Reports, Spring 1920 to Spring 2023

In recent decades, many managers and executives have received company stock and stock options as a portion of their pay. As the incidence of this phenomenon increased, it became evident that insiders needed a way to diversify their holdings. One way this could be accommodated is through the issuance of dividends. This paper examined how executive stock ownership and managerial power impacted a firm’s dividend policy. Specifically, it examined the power of an executive as measured by the G index. It further took into account the current level of ownership for a particular manager, as well as the value of …

You Can’T Stop What You Can’T See: Complementary Risk Mitigation Through Compensation Disclosure, Matt Reeder

William & Mary Business Law Review

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to help prevent the next financial crisis by monitoring executive compensation arrangements to prevent them from becoming excessive or leading to “material financial loss.” A now-pending rule seeks to do just this. This Article argues that the rule is well-conceived inasmuch as it limits the total portion of compensation that can be based on risk-inducing incentives, ties incentive-based compensation to longer-term performance, places a ceiling on potential incentivebased earnings, provides for downward adjustment and clawbacks, prohibits many hedging behaviors, and institutionalizes governance mechanisms and oversight policies. But, by placing a number of …

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, And Net Community Benefits Within Nonprofit Urban Hospitals, Terry Deshawn Long

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Nonprofit hospitals are under increased pressure to maintain financial stability and compliance with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) net community benefit requirements. Boards of directors are not always confident that the compensation packages awarded to executives stimulate them to act in the organization's best interest. The principal-agent theory formed the basis of this correlational study. Archival data from National Center for Charitable Statistics, Guidestar, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services were collected from 117 nonprofit urban hospitals for the fiscal year 2013. Regression analysis was used to determine the significance of relationships between return on assets (ROA), change in …

Essays On Mergers And Acquisitions, Marcin Krolikowski

USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after …

Rewards To Meet Market Expectations: Evidence Of Stock Market Sophistication, Weishen Wang, Mark Pyles, Rachel Graefe-Anderson

Business Faculty Research

Very often, firms report earnings that meet or beat market expectation (MBE). In this study, we empirically document that managers are rewarded more cash bonus when their firm MBE more often, and this relation holds same regardless of the extent of managerial entrenchment. We find that stock market reacts positively overall when firms MBE, but it reacts less positively for firms with entrenched managers. The study shows that stock market is more sophisticated in rewarding firms for meeting or beating market expectation than a firm's cash bonus system does.

The Deadweight Loss Of Equity-Based Compensation, Jessica Pence

CMC Senior Theses

In order to maximize shareholder value, firms attempt to align the incentives of the executives with those of the shareholders by giving them equity as a portion of their compensation package. The terms associated with this equity compensation forces the executives to hold undiversified portfolios, resulting in a sizeable deadweight loss. This paper uses the formula developed by Meulbroek (2001)1 to calculate the dollar value of this deadweight loss, in order to quantify the costs associated with equity-based compensation. We find that the 56 executives in our data set have a combined deadweight loss of $70 billion, and that on …

Essays On Dividend Equivalent Rights And Ceo Compensation, Zi Jia

LSU Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation studies a little-known executive compensation device called dividend equivalent rights (DERs). DERs entitle an executive to receive dividends, known as dividend equivalents (DEs), on unearned performance-based stocks and options. In the first essay we do empirical studies on the market reaction of news about DERs and the incentives that DERs can bring. We find that about 22% of S&P500 firms allow for these payments and about 10% actually make such payments. While investors react negatively to announcements of DE payments, DERs can be beneficial to shareholders by inducing a company to disgorge unproductive cash. If a firm allows …

The Struggle For Power And Pay: Implications Of Board Of Directors' Power On Monitoring Effectiveness And Pay For Performance Sensitivity, Mariana Judith Lebron

Business Administration - Dissertations

Boards of directors monitor and incentivize CEOs to make decisions that maximize shareholder value; however, research has been inconsistent in identifying the relationship between board composition and monitoring effectiveness (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998). Integrating an economic perspective (agency theory) with a socio-psychological perspective (upper echelon theory), this paper examines how outsiders' and insiders' power bases relate to pay-for-performance by proposing and empirically examining a multi-dimensional model of board power bases: ownership, prestige, and structural. I argue that board structural and composition characteristics can be used as proxy indicators of board power. Using data from 37, 066 directors of …

Can Managerial Knowledge Of Executive Compensation Encourage Or Deter Real Earnings Management? An Analysis Of R&D Reporting Methods, Andrea Gouldman

Theses and Dissertations

This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little …

Determinants Of Financial Restatement : Does The Ceo-Board Relationship And Ceo Compensation Influence The Risk Of Financial Restatement?, Kimberly A.M. Melinsky

Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)

The cataclysmic business failures of the past decade clearly outline the necessity for effective governance research and policy. These failures have prompted prominent investors, politicians, and researchers to show an ever-increasing interest in corporate fraudulent activity and its relationship to executive compensation packages and the CEO-board relationship. Further research is needed to better understand these relationships, especially the relationship between governance mechanisms and their influence on financial restatement, an outcome of fraud. This study looks to answer that need by examining the CEO-board relationship, as well as CEO compensation components, the combined effects of CEO compensation and CEO-board relationship variables, …

Performance Sensitivity Of Executive Pay: The Role Of Foreign Investors And Affiliated Directors In Japan, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance factors on the firm performance and executive compensation linkage. Specifically, we examine how domestic corporate-appointed directors, bank-appointed directors and foreign ownership moderate the relationship between firm profitability, sales growth, and executive bonus pay in Japanese firms. Using a sample of the largest Japanese manufacturing companies from 1997 to 2007, we find that corporate-appointed directors positively moderate the relationship between firm growth and bonus pay, while foreign shareholders exhibit a positive moderating effect on the relationship between firm profitability and bonus pay. Bank-appointed directors are straddled between their profitability orientation and relational role: …

Trust And Trustworthiness In The Executive Compensation Policy Required By The Dodd-Frank Act: An Experimental Study, Dana L. Hart

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

As a result of failing financial markets, rampant managerial abuse of shareholder return through grossly unfair compensation packages and shareholder outrage at corporate governance apathy, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July of 2010. Two major provisions contained within the Dodd-Frank legislation are say-on-pay and clawbacks of bonus compensation. This research utilizes a trust game and experimental economics methodologies to test the relative influence of say on pay and clawbacks of bonus compensation on shareholder trust and manager trustworthiness. Results show that shareholders are more likely to participate in the investment process if they …

Tax Tarp Needed For Year One And Year Two Returns Of Executive Bonus To Tarp Recipient: A Case Study Of Year One Rescission/Exclusion From Income And Year Two Deduction Under Section 1341, John W. Lee

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article addresses the tax consequences to AIG Financial employees who repay their controversial retention bonuses in the year of receipt (Year 1) or in a subsequent year (Year 2). At the time the executives received their bonuses, the media and members of Congress raised challenges that might induce such repayment, thus justifying favorable tax treatment for repaying executives. Accordingly, bonuses repaid in year I should be excluded from gross income under the doctrine of Year 1 rescission. Bonuses repaid in Year 2 should result in an adjustment under Section 1341, which reduces the income taxes for Year 2 by …

Essays On Corporate Governance, Tih Koon Tan

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S&P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes …

The Effect Of Age Upon Ceo Compensation: A Cross-Industry Study, Anthony Bouvier

CMC Senior Theses

The compensation of CEO’s has been at the forefront of the public’s mind for the past few years. During the recession, one could not go a day without hearing about the atrocious salaries and bonuses that executives were being paid. Although it only recently became an explosive topic, academics have been researching all aspects of compensation for many years. One of the earliest looked at the idea of pay for performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990), and the field has taken off from there. Many studies have been done on the determinants of compensation, and I was interested in how age …

Backdated Stock Options Ownership Impact On The Corporation, Management, & Shareholders, Karen Cascini, Alan Delfavero

WCBT Faculty Publications

In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOx) world, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on fraudulent activity occurring within corporate America. During recent years, many companies have granted stock options to their executives and employees as part of compensation packages. While the issuance of stock options as a component of compensation is considered to be a legal practice, corruption has taken this corporate resource to unlawful heights. Recently, numerous corporations have been in the news for potentially backdating stock options. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to distinguish between legal and illegal aspects of backdating stock options, and to examine the …

Insider Entrenchment And Ceo Compensation In Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation, Arno Forst

Theses and Dissertations

This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden parachute …

Managerial Incentives And Takeover Wealth Gains, Ebru Reis

Finance Dissertations

ABSTRACT MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND TAKEOVER WEALTH GAINS By EBRU REIS DECEMBER 5, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale Major Department: Finance This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers’ incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers’ incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide …