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Articles 31 - 60 of 113
Full-Text Articles in Business
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman
Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman
Peter Cramton
We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Affidavit identifying manipulation of New York's capacity market by KeySpan and the need for market monitoring and mitigation. On behalf of Consolidated Edison Company of New York.
Why We Need To Stick With Uniform-Price Auctions In Electricity Markets, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Why We Need To Stick With Uniform-Price Auctions In Electricity Markets, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market. Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at the price that balances supply and demand. Buyers with bids above the clearing price pay that price, and suppliers with offers below the clearing price are paid that same price. This uniform-price auction, which occurs both daily and throughout the day, is complemented by forward energy markets. In practice, between 80 and 95 percent of wholesale electricity is traded in forward energy markets, often a month, or a year, and sometimes many years …
Colombia Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Colombia Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provide energy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia’s hydro-dominated electricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in new resources to assure that sufficient firm energy is available in dry periods. Load procures in an annual auction enough firm energy to cover its needs. The firm energy product includes both a financial call option and the physical capability to supply firm energy. The call option protects load from high spot prices and improves the performance of the spot market during scarcity. The market …
How Best To Auction Oil Rights, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Oil Rights, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of oil rights auctions. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take by reducing oil company risk.
Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction parameters. Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical price and operating data to assess performance risk of the …
New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton
New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This note provides a brief description of New England’s Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) for the procurement of electricity capacity. The description is based on the 6 March 2006 Settlement Agreement. The description here presents a simpler description of the auction mechanics, and limits the presentation to the key elements relevant to someone providing software and other support to implement the primary auction. In addition, some motivation for the approach is given. The description here is not a software specification, but rather a high-level description of the auction. Many implementation details are yet to be resolved. These details will be resolved …
The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term capacity markets spawned two design tracks. Long-term contracts led to call-option obligations which provide market-power control and the ability to strengthen performance incentives, but this approach fails to replace the missing money at the root of the adequacy problem. Hogan’s energy-only market fills this gap. On the other track, the short-term capacity markets (ICAP) spawned long-term capacity …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Affidavit in support of the settlement agreement defining the New England Forward Capacity Market. For ISO New England.
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Ex parte communication on various auction rules for the AWS auction.
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Reply declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. The study of combinatorial auctions is inherently interdisciplinary. Combinatorial auctions are in the first place auctions, a topic extensively studied by economists. Package bidding brings in operations research, especially techniques from combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming. Similarly, computer science is concerned with expressiveness of various bidding languages, and algorithmic aspects of the combinatorial problem. The study of combinatorial auctions thus lies at the intersection of economics, operations research, and computer science. In this book, we look at combinatorial …
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
Peter Cramton
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …
Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of dynamic procurement auctions. We consider the procurement of many related items. With many related items, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Three auction formats are considered: simultaneous descending auctions are preferred if the items are not divisible, simultaneous clock auctions are desirable for procuring many divisible goods, and the clock-proxy auction is best if complementarities among items are strong and varied across the suppliers. We examine the properties …
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
A Capacity Market That Makes Sense, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
A Capacity Market That Makes Sense, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, and present a design that avoids problems found in the early capacity markets. The proposed market only rewards capacity that contributes to reliability as demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there is a shortage of operating reserves. The capacity price responds to market conditions, increasing when and where capacity is scarce and decreasing to zero when and where it is sufficiently plentiful. Market power in the capacity market is addressed by basing the capacity price on actual capacity, rather than bid capacity, so generators cannot …
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
New England Power Pool, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the day-ahead market. Doing so greatly increases the complexity of the market without the prospect of more efficient pricing. Rather, offline reserves are most efficiently priced and awarded well in advance, as is done by the improved forward reserve market.
Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Estimating Auction Revenues For The Proposed Fcc Sale Of 3g Spectrum For Broadband And Advanced Wireless Services, Peter Cramton
Estimating Auction Revenues For The Proposed Fcc Sale Of 3g Spectrum For Broadband And Advanced Wireless Services, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton
Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
For Duke Energy.
Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment Of Submissions Of The California Parties, Peter Cramton
Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment Of Submissions Of The California Parties, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton
Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. Common bidding behavior such as “hockey stick” bids easily are explained by suppliers determining their supply offers to maximize profits. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each bidder is independently selecting its bid to maximize profits based on its estimate of the residual demand curve it faces. Profit-maximizing bidding does not mean that “the sky’s the limit.” Typically, bidders are limited in how …