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- Sentience (4)
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- Animal ethics (1)
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- Valence (1)
Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science
Appraising Evidence For Valence, Víctor Carranza-Pinedo
Appraising Evidence For Valence, Víctor Carranza-Pinedo
Animal Sentience
I make some remarks about whether evidence of valenced responses constitutes evidence of valenced states, and therefore of sentience, in organisms.
Sentience And The Science-Policy Interface, Jonathan Birch
Sentience And The Science-Policy Interface, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
I contrast my picture of the relationship between the science and policy of animal sentience with that of Marian Stamp Dawkins, who thinks “the science of animal sentience and the politics of animal welfare should be kept separate” because they involve irreconcilably different standards of evidence. On my alternative picture, (i) the science of animal sentience, like any other empirical science, delivers evidence but not certainty; (ii) this evidence allows us to make better practical decisions, both within and outside science and (iii) the quality standards we apply to the evidence should be high in all contexts, including the formulation …
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell but take issue with their criteria for attributing sentience. This problem is connected with difficult issues concerning moral comparisons and evaluating moral decisions when interspecific moral interests conflict.
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell
Animal Sentience
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections despite their considerable cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary diversity. Some ethical and policy inroads have been made for cephalopod molluscs and crustaceans, but the vast majority of arthropods, including the insects, remain excluded from moral consideration. We argue that this exclusion is unwarranted given the existing evidence. Anachronistic readings of evolution, which view invertebrates as lower in the scala naturae, continue to influence public policy and common morality. The assumption that small brains are unlikely to support cognition or sentience likewise persists, despite growing evidence that arthropods …
Animal Suicide: An Account Worth Giving?, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Suicide: An Account Worth Giving?, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán (2017) argues that empirical evidence and evolutionary theory compel us to treat the phenomenon of suicide as continuous in the animal kingdom. He defends a “continuist” account in which suicide is a multiply-realizable phenomenon characterized by self-injurious and self-annihilative behaviors. This view is problematic for several reasons. First, it appears to mischaracterize the Darwinian view that mind is continuous in nature. Second, by focusing only on surface-level features of behavior, it groups causally and etiologically disparate phenomena under a single conceptual umbrella, thereby reducing the account’s explanatory power. Third, it obscures existing analyses of suicide in biomedical ethics and …
Refining The Precautionary Framework, Jonathan Birch
Refining The Precautionary Framework, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
Most of the commentators so far agree that the precautionary principle can be usefully applied to the question of animal sentience. I consider various ways of refining my proposals in light of the suggestions. I amend BAR to implement C. Brown’s suggestion that the scope of animal welfare law should be extensible by phylogenetic inference from orders in which credible indicators of sentience are found. In response to C. Brown, Mallatt, and Woodruff, I amend ACT to allow that a single credible indicator may sometimes call for urgent further investigation rather than immediate protection. In response …
Reductionism And Accounts Of Cognitive Dissonance, Kent D. Bodily
Reductionism And Accounts Of Cognitive Dissonance, Kent D. Bodily
Animal Sentience
Zentall (2016) proposed within-trial contrast as an alternative account of cognitive dissonance with greater parsimony and generalizability between human and nonhuman species. This commentary describes forms of reductionism, categorizes several competing accounts of cognitive dissonance phenomena, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses according to the reductionist form each account takes. A focus on functional relations may make explanation more parsimonious while bridging theoretical divides between human and nonhuman research programs.
Animal Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a …
Scientific Uncertainty And The Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle, Michael L. Woodruff
Scientific Uncertainty And The Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch offers the animal sentience precautionary principle (ASPP) as a framework for assigning sentience to animals. In doing this, he defines a BAR which when crossed will lead to action (ACT) and implementation of the ASPP. His effort to create a clear empirical basis for implementation of the precautionary principle in the area of animal welfare regulation is important. I argue, however, that his BAR is so low that the evidence supporting ACT is in danger of being overwhelmed by the problems of induction and the underdetermination of theory by evidence. If this happens, policy makers might well disregard …
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims that fish do not feel pain because they lack the neural structures that have a contingent causal role in generating and feeling pain in mammals. I counterargue that no conclusive evidence supports the sufficiency of any mammalian neural structure to produce pain. We cannot move from contingent necessity in mammals to necessity in every organism.
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
Animal Sentience
Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …