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Continental Philosophy

Fordham University

Gadamer

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science

Constellating Technology: Heidegger’S Die Gefahr/The Danger, Babette Babich Jan 2014

Constellating Technology: Heidegger’S Die Gefahr/The Danger, Babette Babich

Research Resources

Heidegger’s question concerning technology was originally posed in lectures to the Club of Bremen. This essay considers the totalizing role of technology in Heidegger’s day and our own, including a discussion of radio and calling for a greater integration of Heidegger’s thinking and critical theory. Today’s media context and the increasing ecological pressures of our time may provide a way to think, once again, the related notions of event [ Ereignis] and ownedness [ Eigentlichkeit ].


Hermeneutical Phenomenology And The Philosophy Of Science, Patrick A. Heelan Jan 1991

Hermeneutical Phenomenology And The Philosophy Of Science, Patrick A. Heelan

Research Resources

Continental philosophy from the start sees science as an institution in a cultural, historical, and hermeneutical setting. The domain of its discourse is values, subjectivity, Life Worlds, history, and society, as these affect the constitution of scientific knowledge. Its notion of truth is that which pertains to history, political power, and culture. Its concern with science is to interpret its historical conditions within human society -- usually in Western culture. Science, from this perspective, is a human, social -- and fallible -- enterprise. A concern of continental philosophy of science will include social failure as a possible indictment of scientific …


Hermeneutics Of Experimental Science In The Context Of The Life-World, Patrick A. Heelan Jan 1974

Hermeneutics Of Experimental Science In The Context Of The Life-World, Patrick A. Heelan

Research Resources

As an element of our total contemporary culture, "historical science" may be distinguished from "experimental" science as the professional business of natural scientists. Phenomenology has always taken a very critical stance against certain defects or biasses -- objectivism, scientism, techicism -- it has found in historical science. I show that these defects and biasses, associated historically with physical science, are not necessary parts of physical science, and consequently, that physics, especially experimental physics, has all of those hermeneutical, ontological, historical and dialectical dimensions negated by historical science.