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The Methodological Roles Of Tolerance And Conventionalism In The Philosophy Of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic Of Science, Emerson P. Doyle Dec 2013

The Methodological Roles Of Tolerance And Conventionalism In The Philosophy Of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic Of Science, Emerson P. Doyle

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of the concepts of science (including mathematics) through the construction and use of suitably robust meta-logical languages. My primary …


Structures In Real Theory Application: A Study In Feasible Epistemology, Robert H. C. Moir Aug 2013

Structures In Real Theory Application: A Study In Feasible Epistemology, Robert H. C. Moir

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This thesis considers the following problem: What methods should the epistemology of science use to gain insight into the structure and behaviour of scientific knowledge and method in actual scientific practice? After arguing that the elucidation of epistemological and methodological phenomena in science requires a method that is rooted in formal methods, I consider two alternative methods for epistemology of science. One approach is the classical approaches of the syntactic and semantic views of theories. I show that typical approaches of this sort are inadequate and inaccurate in their representation of scientific knowledge by showing how they fail to account …