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Full-Text Articles in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics
Ante Rem Structuralism And The No-Naming Constraint, Teresa Kouri
Ante Rem Structuralism And The No-Naming Constraint, Teresa Kouri
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Tim Räz has presented what he takes to be a new objection to Stewart Shapiro's ante rem structuralism (ARS). Räz claims that ARS conflicts with mathematical practice. I will explain why this is similar to an old problem, posed originally by John Burgess in 1999 and Jukka Keränen in 2001, and show that Shapiro can use the solution to the original problem in Räz's case. Additionally, I will suggest that Räz's proposed treatment of the situation does not provide an argument for the in re over the ante rem approach.
Restall's Proof-Theoretic Pluralism And Relevance Logic, Teresa Kouri
Restall's Proof-Theoretic Pluralism And Relevance Logic, Teresa Kouri
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Restall (Erkenntnis 79(2):279–291, 2014) proposes a new, proof-theoretic, logical pluralism. This is in contrast to the model-theoretic pluralism he and Beall proposed in Beall and Restall (Aust J Philos 78(4):475–493, 2000) and in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). What I will show is that Restall has not described the conditions on being admissible to the proof-theoretic logical pluralism in such a way that relevance logic is one of the admissible logics. Though relevance logic is not hard to add formally, one critical component of Restall’s pluralism is that the relevance logic that gets added must …
A New Interpretation Of Carnap's Logical Pluralism, Teresa Kouri
A New Interpretation Of Carnap's Logical Pluralism, Teresa Kouri
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some (though not all) contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that Carnap would agree with this interpretation. Additionally, I show how this interpretation puts the Carnapian position …