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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics
The C3 Conditional: A Variably Strict Ordinary-Language Conditional, Monique L. Whitaker
The C3 Conditional: A Variably Strict Ordinary-Language Conditional, Monique L. Whitaker
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
In this dissertation I provide a novel logic of the ordinary-language conditional. First, however, I endeavor to make clearer and more precise just what the objects of the study of the conditional are, as a lack of clarity as to what counts as an instance of a given category of conditional has resulted in deep and significant confusions in subsequent analysis. I motivate for a factual/counterfactual distinction, though not at the level of particular instances of the conditional. Instead, I argue that each individual instance of the conditional may be interpreted either factually or counterfactually, rather than these instances dividing …
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
OSSA Conference Archive
Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these …
Toward A Kripkean Concept Of Number, Oliver R. Marshall
Toward A Kripkean Concept Of Number, Oliver R. Marshall
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Saul Kripke once remarked to me that natural numbers cannot be posits inferred from their indispensability to science, since we’ve always had them. This left me wondering whether numbers are objects of Russellian acquaintance, or accessible by analysis, being implied by known general principles about how to reason correctly, or both. To answer this question, I discuss some recent (and not so recent) work on our concepts of number and of particular numbers, by leading psychologists and philosophers. Special attention is paid to Kripke’s theory that numbers possess structural features of the numerical systems that stand for them, and to …