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Full-Text Articles in History of Philosophy
“Meddling In The Work Of Another”: Πολυπραγμονεῖν In Plato’S Republic, Brennan Mcdavid
“Meddling In The Work Of Another”: Πολυπραγμονεῖν In Plato’S Republic, Brennan Mcdavid
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
The second conjunct of the Republic’s account of justice—that justice is “not meddling in the work of another”—has been neglected in Plato literature. This paper argues that the conjunct does more work than merely reiterating the content of the first conjunct—that justice is “doing one’s own work.” I argue that Socrates develops the concept at work in this conjunct from its introduction with the Principle of Specialization in Book II to its final deployment in the finished conception of justice in Book IV. Crucial to that concept’s development is the way in which the notion of “another” comes to …
Socrates As A Philosophical Exemplar, Aria Mia Loberti
Socrates As A Philosophical Exemplar, Aria Mia Loberti
Senior Honors Projects
In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates famously denied being a teacher. Nonetheless, others took him to be a teacher, and there is no doubt that his attempts to encourage people to philosophy are pedagogical. So, we are presented with a puzzle—one that is still with interpreters today, despite important work on the issues (e.g., Nehamas 1985, 1992). In this project, I approach these issues from a different angle, asking not whether Socrates is a teacher (or whether philosophy can be taught) but considering Socrates as a philosophical exemplar. I contend that this question will help us to understand not only Socrates but …
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are …