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- Ecology (3)
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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in History of Philosophy
The Mechanistic Approach Of 'The Theory Of Island Biogeography' And Its Current Relevance, Viorel Pâslaru
The Mechanistic Approach Of 'The Theory Of Island Biogeography' And Its Current Relevance, Viorel Pâslaru
Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson (1993), I argue that …
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Viorel Pâslaru
Jani Raerinne and Lindley Darden argue that causal claims are not sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden have to be reconsidered.
Conceptions Of Mechanisms And Insensitivity Of Causation, Viorel Pâslaru
Conceptions Of Mechanisms And Insensitivity Of Causation, Viorel Pâslaru
Viorel Pâslaru
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006).
Ecological Explanation Between Manipulation And Mechanism Description, Viorel Pâslaru
Ecological Explanation Between Manipulation And Mechanism Description, Viorel Pâslaru
Viorel Pâslaru
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfiesWoodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible.
Philipp Frank: Philosophy Of Science, Pragmatism, And Social Engagement, Amy N. Wuest
Philipp Frank: Philosophy Of Science, Pragmatism, And Social Engagement, Amy N. Wuest
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, I then argue that Frank’s work should be understood as an early instance of what is now called “socially …
Locke, Figure, And Judgement: A Consistent Answer To The Molyneux Problem, Jamale Nagi
Locke, Figure, And Judgement: A Consistent Answer To The Molyneux Problem, Jamale Nagi
Student Research Symposium
Ever since the early modern period the Molyneux Problem has been a topic of debate both in the philosophy of perception and the psychology of perception. The problem centers on whether the senses share representational content between one another, or does each sense modality have its own stock of representational content that becomes associated with the others after some habituation. For example, if you knew a shape only by touch, could you identify that shape when seeing it for the first time without being allowed to touch the object? Typically, rationalists have held to the former claiming yes, while empiricists …
'In' Or 'As' Space?: A Model Of Complexity, With Philosophical, Simulatory, And Empirical Ramifications, Charles H. Smith
'In' Or 'As' Space?: A Model Of Complexity, With Philosophical, Simulatory, And Empirical Ramifications, Charles H. Smith
DLPS Faculty Publications
A General Systems model based on ideas originating with the writings of Benedict de Spinoza is described, starting with its philosophical underpinnings, and proceeding on to its relation to modern systems concepts, including attempts to simulate the relationships posed, and measure real world structures. Central to the idea is the notion that spatial extension may not have a prior existence, but emerges only through an entropy maximization process in which information and energy exchange is balanced among some limited number of subsystems that in sum comprise any given functioning complex system. Related published empiricism concerning geographical/geological systems – the hypsometry …
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Jani Raerinne and Lindley Darden argue that causal claims are not sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden have to be reconsidered.
Calling Science Pseudoscience: Fleck’S Archaeologies Of Fact And Latour’S ‘Biography Of An Investigation’ In Aids Denialism And Homeopathy, Babette Babich
Calling Science Pseudoscience: Fleck’S Archaeologies Of Fact And Latour’S ‘Biography Of An Investigation’ In Aids Denialism And Homeopathy, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact foregrounds claims traditionally excluded from reception, often regarded as opposed to fact, scientific claims that are increasingly seldom discussed in connection with philosophy of science save as examples of pseudo-science. I am especially concerned with scientists who question the epidemiological link between HIV and AIDS and who are thereby discounted—no matter their credentials, no matter the cogency of their arguments, no matter the sobriety of their statistics—but also with other classic examples of so-called pseudo-science including homeopathy and other sciences, such as cold fusion. The pseudo-science version of the demarcation problem turns …