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Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy

Multidimensional Consequentialism And Risk, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric Dec 2015

Multidimensional Consequentialism And Risk, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric

Attila Tanyi

In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal is not the best version of multi-dimensional consequentialism. Our reply is that the possibilities of improving multi-dimensional consequentialism are …


Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism And Degrees Of Rightness, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric Dec 2015

Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism And Degrees Of Rightness, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric

Attila Tanyi

In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multi-dimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multi-dimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis – he calls it DEGREE – that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which – Peterson calls this RESOLUTION – each act is always either …


How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the final part of the paper, we propose implementations of the new methodology as applied to the experimental investigation of …


Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist …


Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the intuition, the paper reports empirical evidence of how people see the normative significance of consequentialist requirements.. In a scenario …


Mennyire Lehet Nehéz? A Túlzott Követelések Ellenvetésének Újszerű Megközelítései (‘How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches To The Overdemandingness Objection’), Attila Tanyi Dec 2012

Mennyire Lehet Nehéz? A Túlzott Követelések Ellenvetésének Újszerű Megközelítései (‘How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches To The Overdemandingness Objection’), Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper begins with a detailed discussion of the Overdemandingness Objection to consequentialism. It argues that the best interpretation of the Objection is the one that focuses on reasons: consequentialism is overdemanding because it demands us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to do. After this, the paper goes on to offer three – so far in the literature unpursued – responses to the Objection. The first puts forward a constitutive role of instutions in determining and, in face of the Objection, lowering the demands of consequentialism; the second argues that consequentialism …


The Case For Authority, Attila Tanyi Dec 2011

The Case For Authority, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are unacceptably demanding. This is called the Overdemandingness Objection. The paper first distinguishes three interpretations of the Objection as based on the three dimensions of moral demands: scope, content, and authority. It is then argued that neither the scope, nor the content-based understanding of the Objection is viable. Constraining the scope of consequentialism is neither helpful, nor justified, hence the pervasiveness of consequentialism cannot be the ground for the Objection. Although recent approaches interpret the Objection as a claim about the excessively demanding content …