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Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
When Justice Demands Inequality, John Thrasher, Keith Hankins
When Justice Demands Inequality, John Thrasher, Keith Hankins
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of egalitarianism equality, freedom, and welfare are not always compatible. Justice will require trade-offs between these values. Sometimes, equality will need …
Ordering Anarchy, John Thrasher
Ordering Anarchy, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justified. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the importance of evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition, the social contract has …
The Fragility Of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity And Stability, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
The Fragility Of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity And Stability, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect …