Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle's Generic Being, Edward C. Halper
Aristotle's Generic Being, Edward C. Halper
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Being is not a genus in the strict sense because there is no categorial nature that is common to all beings. This paper argues that Aristotle nevertheless treats being as a genus, that this treatment is what he means in Metaphysics Gamma by the science that studies being qua being, and that what is common to all beings is not some particular nature, but their each having a nature. This nature is its ousia, and in Gamma, these ousiai are the primary beings to which other beings are related, though later in the Metaphysics, in a different stage …
Ontological Independence In Aristotle's Categories, Phil Corkum
Ontological Independence In Aristotle's Categories, Phil Corkum
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Aristotle holds that substances (such as you and me) are ontologically independent from nonsubstances (such as our qualities and quantities) but nonsubstances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between substances and nonsubstances with respect to ontological dependence. Such asymmetry is widely and rightly thought to be a lynchpin of Aristotelian metaphysics. What is really real for Aristotle are such ordinary objects as you and me. Our properties - my paleness, your generosity - inhabit Aristotle's ontology only in so far as they are ours. This much we can all agree on; and I'll only briefly rehearse …
Metaphysics H 6 And The Problem Of Unity, Hye-Kyung Kim
Metaphysics H 6 And The Problem Of Unity, Hye-Kyung Kim
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
I argue that H 6 should be taken as Aristotle's clarification on the causelessness in the unity of the parts of definition. In H 6 Aristotle is concerned with a general metaphysical problem affecting - threatening - his theory of substance at two major points. The unity of genus and differentia in the definition of form has to be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. If it were not accounted for, form would not be the primary cause of being and thus not primary substance. The unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance also has …
Dialectic And Definition In Aristotle's Topics, May Sim
Dialectic And Definition In Aristotle's Topics, May Sim
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
The middle term between dialectic and being is definition. Definitions are formulae of essences or substances. Thus, one’s view of substance will depend on one’s view of definition: what a definition is, and how it is acquired. Further, insofar as definitions are arrived at through dialectic, definitions depend on dialectic. That is, the specific procedure of dialectic shapes the mode of definition, and the mode of definition shapes the notion of being. Not only does dialectic shape being through definition, but being and knowledge of it also determines dialectic. In short, these three things go together: dialectic, definition and being. …
Aristotle On Unity: Metaphysics Delta 6, Constantine Georgiadis
Aristotle On Unity: Metaphysics Delta 6, Constantine Georgiadis
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
The brief passage on accidental unity (ἕv κατὰ συμβεβηκός) in Chapter 6 of Metaphysics Δ (1015b 16-34) raises a number of questions for which the text does not provide explicit answers. Aristotle does not define the nature of accidental unity, nor does he explain the status and character of the items which partake in accidental unities. One may wonder whether those items pertain to language, or to reality or whether they involve a certain relation of language to reality. Aristotle lists different examples which are purported to illustrate different kinds of accidental unity but those kinds are not described in …
Aristotle On Genus And Differentia In The Topics And Categories, Herbert Granger
Aristotle On Genus And Differentia In The Topics And Categories, Herbert Granger
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Each of Aristotle's early works, the Topics and the Categories, provides important evidence for Aristotle's holding two accounts of the nature of genus and differentia. In one account genus and differentia are radically distinct in nature. In the other they are much the same. In this paper I make a case for Aristotle holding each account, suggest why he adopts them, and consider which of the two is the earlier one.