Ancient Philosophy Commons^™

Aristotle On [Part Of] The Difference Between Belief And Imagination, Ian Mccready Flora

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In book 3, chapter 3 of his On the Soul, Aristotle gives several arguments meant to demonstrate the type non-identity of belief and imagination. Each of these arguments rewards study, but this discussion will focus on one in particular, perhaps the most puzzling. The argument concerns the relation between truth and control. Belief is connected with truth and falsehood in a way that imagination is not, and that in turn means that we can control what we imagine in a way that we cannot control what we believe. Here is Aristotle’s argument in full:

(1) It’s clear as well …

Aristotle's Abstract Ontology, Allan Bäck

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle has a metaphysics of individual substances, substrata persisting through time that are neither in nor said of a subject. That I do not dispute. However, when we move from the individual to the universal, from perception to knowledge, Aristotle has a metaphysics of relations. This I will try to sketch out here.

Aristotle appeals to abstraction at key places in his philosophy. Somehow abstraction gets us to the first principles and to the objects of the most fundamental sciences. Somehow universals are abstracted from singulars and have no transcendent existence.

Aristotle never states his theory of abstraction formally or …

Form And Flux In The Theaetetus And Timaeus, David P. Hunt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The subject of this essay is the "Heraclitean" flux in the Theaetetus and its role in the discussion of the first definition of knowledge, particularly in light of the flux doctrine that Plato propounds in the Timaeus. There are two principal interpretive approaches to the argument in this part of the Theaetetus, and the question whether its theory of flux is, to any appreciable degree, Plato's own view is perhaps the central issue dividing the two camps. Though the Timaeus has been cursorily cited by the one camp, and as cursorily dismissed by the other, I believe that a closer …

Aristotle On Knowledge, Nous And The Problems Of Necessary Truth, Thomas Kiefer

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper, I argue that nous for Aristotle concerns necessary truths. (1) Nous is the solution to the dilemma raised in Posterior Analytics I.3. (2) Knowledge and nous have necessary truths as their subject matter, and are identical to this subject matter. (3) This position creates two problems concerning (i) the innateness of knowledge and nous, and (ii) the mind-dependency of necessary truths. (4) The end of DA III.5 reveals an attempt to solve (i) and (ii): The necessary truths of knowledge and nous are for us innate in a certain way, appear to come to be and pass …

Dialectic And Definition In Aristotle's Topics, May Sim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The middle term between dialectic and being is definition. Definitions are formulae of essences or substances. Thus, one’s view of substance will depend on one’s view of definition: what a definition is, and how it is acquired. Further, insofar as definitions are arrived at through dialectic, definitions depend on dialectic. That is, the specific procedure of dialectic shapes the mode of definition, and the mode of definition shapes the notion of being. Not only does dialectic shape being through definition, but being and knowledge of it also determines dialectic. In short, these three things go together: dialectic, definition and being. …

The Philosophical Economy Of Plato's Psychology: Common Concepts In The Timaeus, Dorothea Aline Frede

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Plato's insistence that the eternal immobile model is “the real thing” and the mobile world only an image is to stress the sincerity of his conviction that the intelligible pattern, the unchangeable network of principles, must be the foundation of the physical reality. Only because there is such a fundamentum in re can we have concepts that allow us to understand and explain the world. Without such really existing concepts our thinking would be nothing, it would be a groping for stability in a changing world that could at best provide similarities without any fix point to determine their nature. …

Failure And Expertise In The Ancient Conception Of An Art, James Allen

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The ancient notion of an art (τέχνη) embraced a wide range of pursuits from handicrafts like shoemaking and weaving to more exalted disciplines not excluding philosophy (cf. Plato Gorgias 486b; Hippolytus Refutatio. 570,8 DDG; Sext. Emp. Μ II13). Nevertheless, there was a sufficient amount of agreement about what was expected of an art to permit debates about whether different practices qualified as arts. According to the conception which made these debates possible, an art is a body of knowledge concerning a distinct subject matter which enables the artist to achieve a definite type of beneficial result. Obviously, the failure of …

Episteme And Logos In Plato's Later Thought, Alexander Nehamas

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

"What is knowledge?" Plato does try to answer this question, asked at the beginning of the Theaetetus, but the answer is not in the dialogue itself, either negatively (as Cornford argued) or positively (as Fine suggested). His answer is partially given in the Sophist and Statesman: the project of definition has been shown to involve the mastery of the whole field to which the object of definition belongs, and hence a science of the field in question. The dramatic sequels to the Theaetetus are also its doctrinal complements. By making knowledge the object of knowledge, Plato was able to …

The Form Of The Good In Plato's Republic, Gerasimos X. Santas

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic is truly and coherently the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art. In this theory of the Form of the Good Plato was truly the first grand philosophical synthesiser. If to achieve such a grand synthesis he had to employ a few unholy combinations, such as the combination of reality, goodness, and self-predication, he may perhaps be forgiven - at least if he is understood.