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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity
Ceaselessly Testing The Good Of Death, Danielle A. Layne
Ceaselessly Testing The Good Of Death, Danielle A. Layne
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
The hope Socrates invokes during his defence becomes a statement to be tested and corroborated, and thus a catalyst for discovery rather than a valueless rejection of all arguments, beliefs or in Socratic terms “hopes.” In his prison cell Socrates tests the propositions in the Apology that death may be a good and in the Phaedo these arguments affirm Socrates’ hope, making it the more valuable belief. Thus since no man willing chooses evil, a valueless not knowing, over the good, the value-laden hope regardless of not-knowing, Socrates commits himself to the “great perhaps” of the immortality of the soul. …
A Religious Revolution? How Socrates' Theology Undermined The Practice Of Sacrifice, Anna Lannstrom
A Religious Revolution? How Socrates' Theology Undermined The Practice Of Sacrifice, Anna Lannstrom
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Mark McPherran and Gregory Vlastos argue that Socrates’ theology threatened Athenian sacrificial practices because it rejected the do ut des principle (aka the principle of reciprocity). I argue that their arguments are flawed because they assume that the Athenians understood sacrifice as something like a commercial transaction. Drawing upon scholarship in anthropology and religious studies, I argue that we need to revise that understanding of sacrifice and that, once we do, McPherran’s and Vlastos’ arguments no longer show that Socrates would have been a significant threat to the practice of sacrifice. Finally, I argue that McPherran’s Socrates does undermine sacrifice, …
Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus
Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
Sagp/Ssips 2010 Program, Anthony Preus
Sagp/Ssips 2010 Program, Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5, John F. Bowin
Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5, John F. Bowin
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Just as the coming to be of a substance may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the coming to be of the composite or of the individual form, so the process of learning may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the oscillation between states of truth and error or as the ‘settling down’ or cessation of this oscillation at the stage where knowledge has become a stable disposition (hexis). And …
Intelligible Matter In Aristotle, John Thorp
Intelligible Matter In Aristotle, John Thorp
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
The oxymoronic phrase ‘intelligible matter’ occurs three times in Aristotle. In two passages it has the same meaning; in the third the meaning seems radically different. This gives the impression that the Aristotelian language of metaphysics is distressingly slack. This paper argues, against the nearly unanimous voice of two millennia of commentaries, that ‘intelligible matter’ has the same meaning in all three loci. In doing so it develops a capital distinction that tightens up the apparatus of Aristotelian metaphysics.
Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy, Joel Mann
Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy, Joel Mann
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
That no one can or should be convicted in a law court on pollution charges is, I suggest, the implicit message of Antiphon’s second Tetralogy. More than a mere rhetorical exercise, Antiphon offers us a rational and compelling critique of religious law and of legal responsibility generally. In so doing, he anticipates modern puzzles in the philosophy of law as well as some of their more sophisticated solutions. A work not only of ingenious skepticism but also of considerable subtlety, the second Tetralogy should be considered the product of a philosopher who made perhaps the most substantial extant contribution to …
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac, Anthony Preus
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac, Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia, May Sim
What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia, May Sim
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Megalopsychia (the greatness of soul) also translated as pride, or magnanimity, is a virtue Aristotle attributes to the good person regarding his claim to be worthy of great things, namely, honor. Despite this definition, commentators like C. Rowe, H. Curzer, R. Polansky and J. Stover, all chose to de-emphasize the centrality of honor in Aristotle’s definition of megalopsychia. Aristotle’s assertion that honor is the greatest external good also seems to be in tension with megalopsychia as a virtue that is to be pursued for its own sake, not to mention its tension with his remark that friendship is the greatest …
Against Hedonist Interpretations Of Plato's Protagoras, J. Clerk Shaw
Against Hedonist Interpretations Of Plato's Protagoras, J. Clerk Shaw
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
In this paper, I adapt one of the pro-hedonist strategies to anti-hedonist ends. Just as some prohedonists insist that Plato’s arguments against hedonism elsewhere do not touch the actual theory found in the Protagoras (again, PH), I argue that the most natural reading of PH is inconsistent with views found in purportedly earlier dialogues (especially the Apology and Crito) as well as in purportedly later dialogues (such as the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic). In section 1, I argue that PH focuses entirely on bodily goods and bads.11 Then, in section 2, I argue that this makes the relationship between virtue …
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.3 (Central Division), Anthony Preus
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.3 (Central Division), Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
Empirical And Dialogical Proofs Of God's Existence In Laws 10, Lewis Trelawny-Cassity
Empirical And Dialogical Proofs Of God's Existence In Laws 10, Lewis Trelawny-Cassity
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Book 10 of the Laws is intended to prove that the gods exist, care for us, and are not persuaded by bribes (885b7-9). The arguments put forward concerning the gods in Book 10 are described as “our noblest and best prelude (kalliston te kai ariston prooimion) on behalf of the laws” (887c1). In this paper I want to investigate how Plato establishes the fact that nous, “god, in the correct sense, for the gods” (897b2), exists. Some scholars have noted the “empirical” character of Plato’s arguments for the existence of god in Laws 10. While empirical facts do provide an …
A Problem For The Political Reading Of Plato's Republic, Mason Marshall
A Problem For The Political Reading Of Plato's Republic, Mason Marshall
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
On one of the most common readings of the Republic, Plato means for us to agree with Socrates and his interlocutors that their aristocratic city is the just polis. For convenience, I call this the political reading. It is no wonder, of course, that this interpretation is as common as it is, since it might be one of the most natural interpretations of the Republic. I argue, though, that it faces a serious problem: Socrates and his interlocutors’ argument for the justice of the aristocratic city has certain deficits, and—more important—there is considerable evidence that Plato was aware of at …