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Answer To Commentators, Harald R. Wohlrapp

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No abstract provided.

Wohlrapp’S The Concept Of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation, Ralph Johnson

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No abstract provided.

Commentary On The Concept Of Argument By Harald Wohlrapp, Katharina Stevens

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No abstract provided.

The Concept Of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation - Issues Of Logicism And Objectivity, Trudy Govier

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I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be apparent, even on this single topic more could be said. What I will discuss today are the themes of logicism and objectivity.

Commentary On Harald R. Wohlrapp, The Concept Of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation, Derek Allen

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No abstract provided.

The Concept Of Argument: Introductory Statement, Harald R. Wohlrapp

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How to provide, in only 10 minutes, a kind of insight into the conception of argument that I have displayed in my book? This book has 500 pages and is the result of more than 25 years of work with my research group in Hamburg. Therefore it is a delicate task to give a substantive information about it in just some minutes. Despite this, I will start with something outside that task: I will deeply thank my commentators to have studied my book and have made up their minds about it. In particular I thank David Hitchcock who has initiated …

Imagine The Audience – On Audience Research In Rhetoric, Argumentation, And Christopher Tindale’S The Philosophy Of Argumentation And Audience Reception, Jens E. Kjeldsen

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Without audiences there would be no rhetorical argumentation. Without audiences there would be no rhetoric. Without audiences there would be no argumentation. The importance of audiences for rhetoric and argumentation cannot be overstated. Thus, considering the constitutive necessity of audiences in our fields, it is strange, if not down right worrying, that we spend so few pages on researching audiences. Fortunately, Professor Christopher Tindale has addressed this lacuna in many publications, and now he has done it in a book length work on the Philosophy of Argumentation and Audience Reception (Tindale 2015) The thrust of the argument in his book …

Comments On Christopher W. Tindale’S The Philosophy Of Argument And Audience Reception, Manfred E. Kraus, Manfred Kraus

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No abstract provided.

Arguing Conductively Or Arguing Strategically?, Yun Xie

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The topic of conductive argument has attracted much attention in recent argumentation studies, but most of the existing discussions are centered on a logical or epistemological perspective. This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could also be understood from a rhetorical perspective, and to offer a Pragma-dialectical point of view regarding to the likelihood and importance of conductive arguments. In particular, it is contended that the mentioning of counter-considerations in a conductive argument is mainly for some rhetorical concerns in order to achieve better persuasiveness in audience. On that basis, it is argued that conductive arguments can be theorized …

The Emotional Life Of Reason: Exploring Conceptions Of Objectivity, Robert C. Pinto, Laura E. Pinto

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This paper extends Pinto’s (2011) “Emotions and Reasons” (in which he argued that emotions provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons are constitutive elements of emotions) by exploring relationships between emotions-as-reasons and in (re)conceptualizing objectivity as naturalized to address the evaluative dimension. The paper addresses the emotional character of reason with respect to subjective and normative validity by shifting analysis to socially situated practices.

Outstanding Questions About Analogies, Trudy Govier

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I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: (a) issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; (b) whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and (c) whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for …

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

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The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.

Commentary On Constructing A Periodic Table Of Arguments, Yun Xie

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This is the Commentary on Wagemans' paper "Constructing a Periodic Table of Arguments".

Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias, Derek Allen

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On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type …

Commentary On Explicating And Negotiating Bias In Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools, Tracy A. Bowell

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No abstract provided.

The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker

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Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these …

Eliminating Gender-, Racial- And Age-Biases In Medical Diagnostic Reasoning (Paper), Brian Macpherson Dr.

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Much attention has been paid in the literature to the deleterious effects of errors in diagnostic reasoning due to underlying cognitive biases. This is an important topic since people’s lives and well-being are at stake. Empirical studies cited by Chapman et al. (2013) corroborate the view that gender, racial, or age biases exist in a significant number of clinicians, thereby limiting objective diagnosis. Croskerry (2003, 2013) endorses a so-called metacognitive (or cognitive ‘forcing’) approach to achieve de-biasing in clinicians, a key component of which is critical self-reflection on one’s own diagnostic reasoning (Croskerry, 2003). However, the first empirical study of …

Two-Wise And Three-Wise Similarity, And Non-Deductive Analogical Arguments, Marcello Guarini

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This paper will add to the discourse on analogical arguments by showing that they need not be deductively reconstructed in common contexts of persuasion. Analogical arguments have varying degrees of similarity, which helps us to understand their varying degrees of strength. Pace Shecaira (2013) it will be argued that this is a common and useful way of examining analogical arguments. It will be shown that deductive reconstruction does not adequately capture the needed degrees of strength.

Let us start with two-wise similarity claims. Subject S₁ says that the disputed case C₁ is (relevantly) similar to C₂ and …

Open Mindedness, Tracy A. Bowell Dr, Justine Kingsbury Dr

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Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and other such habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas" (1910, p. 30). It is commonly included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues. We begin this paper with brief discussion of various accounts of open-mindedness. Our principle interest is in what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Drawing on two cases, we consider whether open-minded behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and community enquiry and whether inquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these contexts. …

Commentary On 'Acts Of Ostension', Paul L. Simard Smith

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No abstract provided.

Commentary On 'Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?', William R. Minto

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No abstract provided.

Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell

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There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others (in particular our students) to think critically about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.

Revising Toulmin’S Model: Argumentative Cell And The Bias Of Objectivity, Thierry Herman

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This paper presents what we call with Plantin (1900, 2005) an argumentative cell as an unit which is inspired by Toulmin’s layout of arguments (and refined with linguistic insights), in order to analyse two major effects of pseudo-objectivity in argumentation. Four problems of Toulmin's layout will be tackled: (1) Data are only described as facts, (2) the definition of Backing is blurred, but it may be linked with sources of information (linguistic evidentiality) and extended to Data, (3) the dialectical component of the Rebuttal needs to be extended to concessions, and (4) dealing with complex argumentation (linked and convergent argument) …

Commentary On "What Should A Normative Theory Of Argument Look Like?", David Zarefsky

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No abstract provided.

Conspiracy And Bias: Argumentative Features And Persuasiveness Of Conspiracy Theories, Steve Oswald

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This paper deals with the argumentative biases Conspiracy Theories (henceforth CTs) typically suffer from and pursues two goals: (i) the identification of recurring argumentative and rhetorical features of conspiracy theories, which translates into an attempt to elaborate their argumentative profile (see Hansen 2013); (ii) the elaboration of a cognitively-grounded account of CTs in terms of their persuasiveness.

To fulfil goal (i), I examine online instances of different cases of CTs (the Moon hoax, 9/11 as an inside job, chemical trails). Building on the general rhetorical features of CTs identified by Byford (2011: 88-93), I elaborate a first argumentative profile surveying …

What Should A Normative Theory Of Argumentation Look Like?, Lilian Bermejo-Luque

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Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is "should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons?". On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: "does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing?". Both accounts assimilate …

Comments On Derek Allen’S “Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias”, Neil Mehta

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No abstract provided.

Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo

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We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of deliberation based on practical reasoning, characterised by revisions of the initial issue made necessary by the agents’ increased knowledge …

Commentary On: John Fields’S “Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro

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No abstract provided.

On Appeals To (Visual) Models, Ian Dove

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In some visual cases, especially those in which one reasons from a visual model to a conclusion, it is tempting to think that some new normative base, perhaps a visual logic is in order. I show that, at least in the case of what I’ll call appeal to visual models, the same criteria are required in visual and verbal cases.