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Articles 31 - 60 of 96
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Review Of The Book Incentives, Cooperation And Risk Sharing: Economic And Psychological Perspectives On Employment Contracts, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Review Of The Book Incentives, Cooperation And Risk Sharing: Economic And Psychological Perspectives On Employment Contracts, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
[Excerpt] The current volume, which grew out of a two-day conference held at New York University in 1984, is an excellent introduction to compensation policy research and practice. A unique aspect of the volume is its interdisciplinary orientation; the contributors include academic economists and industrial psychologists, as well as practicing compensation and personnel and human resource specialists. A very readable introductory essay by the editor provides general discussion of analytical issues in compensation policy research and whets the reader's appetite for the papers that follow.
Unguaranteed Money In The Nfl: A Useful Tool For Risky Players, Wayne Simpson
Unguaranteed Money In The Nfl: A Useful Tool For Risky Players, Wayne Simpson
Honors Theses
This study is investigating whether or not the percentage of non‐guaranteed money or length in NFL contracts reflects how risky players are as judged by past statistics. While sports economists have completed numerous studies on the motivational power of incentives, a study trying to identify the riskiness of players to lead to the strategic use of non‐guaranteed money and length of contract is a new idea. Contract details were gathered for running backs and wide receivers on NFL rosters for the 2012 season from rotoworld.com. Players who were still on rookie contracts and who were primarily special teams players were …
Waging War On Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering In Pharmacy Benefit Design, Chad I. Brooker
Waging War On Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering In Pharmacy Benefit Design, Chad I. Brooker
Chad I Brooker
Specialty drugs represent a growing concern for both health insurance issuers and beneficiaries given their exceedingly high (and growing) costs—representing almost half of all drug spend by 2017. Payers have sought to reduce their specialty drug spend by sharing more of the cost of these drugs with the beneficiaries who depend on them through the creation of specialty drug tiers. This has forced some patients to choose between forgoing other needs to pay for their medications or not take them at all. While several states have sought to outlaw the use of specialty drug tiers or limit pharmaceutical OOP cost-sharing, …
Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown
Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown
Latoya C. Brown, Esq.
This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. …
The Psychology Of Contract Precautions, David A. Hoffman, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
The Psychology Of Contract Precautions, David A. Hoffman, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
All Faculty Scholarship
This research tests the intuition that parties to a contract approach each other differently before the contract is formed than they do once it is finalized. We argue that one of the most important determinants of self-protective behavior is whether the promisee considers herself to be in negotiations or already in an ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects precaution-taking even when it has no practical bearing on the costs and benefits of self-protection: the moment of contracting is a reference point that frames the costs and benefits of taking precautions. We present the results of three questionnaire studies in which …
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Research Collection School Of Economics
We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.
Let's Talk About Text: Contracts, Claims, And Judicial Philosophy At The Federal Circuit, Andrew T. Langford
Let's Talk About Text: Contracts, Claims, And Judicial Philosophy At The Federal Circuit, Andrew T. Langford
IP Theory
No abstract provided.
Regulation Of Intellectual Property And Contract Structure, Ouida Black
Regulation Of Intellectual Property And Contract Structure, Ouida Black
All Theses
This paper seeks to address the newest issue arising between songwriters and their record companies in the music industry which is the underpayment of royalties. This paper will seek to answer if with more and more artists and songwriters suing for compensation due to underpayment of royalties, will artists lose the incentive to create new music and eventually decrease overall production? Clearly defining and regulating intellectual property and the use and efficiency of contracts will be topics for discussion. After testing my hypothesis, some results show no decrease, whereas, other results report some decrease in record company and songwriter incentives …
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.
The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow
The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow
Master's Theses
Drawing on firm-level data from the district of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, India, this study explores the role of family ties as a means to counteract potential moral hazard concerns. It is shown that firms will be more likely to employ family relations when faced with a higher hidden context for moral hazard. Specifically, the analysis finds that the presence of family members within the firm is higher when the firm provides general training and that firms that are more likely to do external business with family relations when it is believed that the legal system is not effective. Additionally, …
Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory Of Altering Rules, Ian Ayres
Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory Of Altering Rules, Ian Ayres
Ian Ayres
Whenever a rule is contractible, the law must establish separate rules governing how private parties can contract around the default legal treatment. To date, contract theorists have not developed satisfying theories for how optimally to set “altering rules,” the rules that set out the necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a default. This Article argues that efficiency-minded lawmakers in setting altering rules should consider both the costs of altering and the costs of various kinds of error. There are two broad reasons for altering rules to deviate from attempts to minimize the transaction cost of altering, First, the Article develops …
United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
This chapter adopts the working assumption that it is conceivable that at some time in the future it would be in the interest of the United States to restructure its sovereign debt (i.e., to reduce the principal amount). It addresses in particular U.S. Treasury Securities. The chapter first provides an overview of the intermediated, tiered holding system for book-entry Treasuries. For the first time the chapter then explores whether and how—logistically and legally—such a restructuring could be effected. It posits the sort of dire scenario that might make such a restructuring advantageous. It then outlines a novel scheme …
The Promise Principle And Contract Interpretation, Juliet P. Kostritsky
The Promise Principle And Contract Interpretation, Juliet P. Kostritsky
Juliet P Kostritsky
The promise principle and its roots in a certain type of morality of individual obligation, which play the central role in Charles Fried’s vision of Contract law, have importantly contributed to rescuing Contract law from absorption into Tort law and from the imposition of externally imposed standards that are collective in origin. It makes a mammoth contribution to alerting us to the tyranny of interference with individual self-determination. However, this essay questions whether a promise centered system derived from a moral philosophy of promising (without an observable and testable foundation in reality) and geared to internal individual obligation and duty …
Do Major League Baseball Hitters Come Up Big In Their Contract Year?, Heather M. O'Neill, Matthew J. Hummel
Do Major League Baseball Hitters Come Up Big In Their Contract Year?, Heather M. O'Neill, Matthew J. Hummel
Business and Economics Faculty Publications
In sports, especially baseball, there is a lot of talk about contract year performance. Beginning in spring training and continuing throughout the season, sports journalists and fans converse about how players in the last year of their contract will perform. Experts in the media, often ex-baseball players themselves, speculate contract year players will have break-out seasons in order to secure a better contract in upcoming contract negotiations. This leads to the question: do baseball players increase their effort and performance during their contract year to increase the value of their next contract?
A Moral Contractual Approach To Labor Law Reform: A Template For Using Ethical Principles To Regulate Behavior Where Law Failed To Do So Effectively, Zev J. Eigen, David S. Sherwyn
A Moral Contractual Approach To Labor Law Reform: A Template For Using Ethical Principles To Regulate Behavior Where Law Failed To Do So Effectively, Zev J. Eigen, David S. Sherwyn
Faculty Working Papers
If laws cease to work as they should or as intended, legislators and scholars propose new laws to replace or amend them. This paper posits an alternative—offering regulated parties the opportunity to contractually bind themselves to behave ethically. The perfect test-case for this proposal is labor law, because (1) labor law has not been amended for decades, (2) proposals to amend it have failed for political reasons, and are focused on union election win rates, and less on the election process itself, (3) it is an area of law already statutorily regulating parties' reciprocal contractual obligations, and (4) moral means …
Equipping The Garage Guys In Law, Gillian K. Hadfield
Equipping The Garage Guys In Law, Gillian K. Hadfield
Gillian K Hadfield
The twin structural changes of the last few decades—globalization and the emergence of a web-based platform for economic activity--have transformed the economic demand for law. The market for law, however, has struggled to keep up with these changes, showing few signs of the kind of innovation that we see in many other sectors of the new economy. Even our most sophisticated and innovative corporations report difficulty in finding lawyers with the kinds of risk-attuned and creative problem-solving skills that they need (Hadfield 2011). Some large corporate clients have gone so far as to refuse to hire new law firm associates, …
Product Market Competition And The Taxonomy Of Managerial Compensation, Jose Plehn-Dujowich, Konstantinos Serfes
Product Market Competition And The Taxonomy Of Managerial Compensation, Jose Plehn-Dujowich, Konstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes
No abstract provided.
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …
Breach Is For Suckers, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman
Breach Is For Suckers, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper presents results from three experiments offering evidence that parties see breach of contract as a form of exploitation, making disappointed promisees into “suckers.” In psychology, being a sucker turns on a three-part definition: betrayal, inequity, and intention. We used web-based questionnaires to test the effect of each of the three factors separately. Our results support the hypothesis that when breach of contract cues an exploitation schema, people become angry, offended, and inclined to retaliate even when retaliation is costly. This theory offers a useful advance insofar it explains why victims of breach demand more than similarly situated tort …
Cooperation Before Contract: The Law And Policy Of Expenses Incurred During Negotiations In Comparative Perspective, Luigi Russi
Cooperation Before Contract: The Law And Policy Of Expenses Incurred During Negotiations In Comparative Perspective, Luigi Russi
Luigi Russi
Pending negotiations for a contract, one party may begin to incur expenses in fulfilment of the proposed economic operation in anticipation of the finalisation of a formal contract, which is a common practice in many settings, from building and lease contracts to contracts for services in general. This book, therefore, focuses on controversies that may arise when an expected contract collapses after one party withdraws from negotiations, with an ensuing attempt to determine what liability, if any, the withdrawing party should face regarding expenses incurred by the other. The laws of England and Italy, along with several non-legislative codifications – …
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
Working Paper Series
In any large corporate acquisition, there is a delay between the time the parties enter into a merger agreement (the signing) and the time the merger is effected and the purchase price paid (the closing). During this period, the business of one of the parties may deteriorate. When this happens to a target company in a cash deal, or to either party in a stock-for-stock deal, the counterparty may no longer want to consummate the transaction. The primary contractual protection parties have in such situations is the merger agreement’s “material adverse change” (MAC) clause. Such clauses are heavily negotiated and …
Substance Or Mere Technique? A Precis On Good Faith Performance In England, France And Germany, Luigi Russi
Substance Or Mere Technique? A Precis On Good Faith Performance In England, France And Germany, Luigi Russi
Luigi Russi
This paper attempts to offer a concise discussion of good faith performance and other functionally equivalent doctrines in the laws of England, Germany and France. The study’s goal is that of appraising the consistency of existing differences. More specifically, of whether they relate merely to technique - not being paralleled by diverging final outcomes - or whether the rift is deeper and goes to the very substance of the approach to the solution of similar practical problems. For this purpose, the work first shows the close connection between good faith performance (of contractual obligations) and good faith enforcement (of contractual …
Fairness In Contractual Relations: An Economic-Oriented Understanding Of Good Faith Performance, Luigi Russi
Fairness In Contractual Relations: An Economic-Oriented Understanding Of Good Faith Performance, Luigi Russi
Luigi Russi
This is a derivative version of 'Can Good Faith Performance Be Unfair? An Economic Framework for Understanding the Problem', which appeared in the Whittier Law Review, vol. 29, 2008. In comparison to the version therein published, I have eliminated the mathematical appendix, and attempted to outline my reasoning exclusively in words, for it to be accessible to a wider readership.
Using The Unidroit Principles To Fill Gaps In The Cisg, John Y. Gotanda
Using The Unidroit Principles To Fill Gaps In The Cisg, John Y. Gotanda
Working Paper Series
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) sets forth only a basic framework for the recovery of damages, thereby giving a court of tribunal broad authority to determine an aggrieved party’s loss based on circumstances of the particular case. Unfortunately, the lack of specificity has resulted in much litigation, and seemingly conflicting results. To remedy this problem, some have argued that the gaps in the CISG damages provisions should be filled with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. In this paper, I argue that the gap-filling rules of CISG preclude the UNIDROIT Principles from being …
Inefficient Worker Turnover, Nicolas L. Jacquet
Inefficient Worker Turnover, Nicolas L. Jacquet
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches.
The Hidden Harm Of Law And Economics, Daniel I A Cohen
The Hidden Harm Of Law And Economics, Daniel I A Cohen
ExpressO
The paper deals with the adverse psychodynamic consequences to an individual and to society, immediately and in the long run, of dissolving individual responsibility for fault as in the doctrine of Law and economics.
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.
Price Discrimination With Contract Terms: The Lost Volume Problem, Barry E. Adler, Alan Schwartz
Price Discrimination With Contract Terms: The Lost Volume Problem, Barry E. Adler, Alan Schwartz
ExpressO
In a common commercial pattern, the seller of a standard product contracts with one buyer and then sells to another at the contract price after the initial buyer breaches. Sellers argue, and courts largely agree, that the seller could have served the contract buyer as well as the later buyer; hence, the seller is entitled to retain a down payment to the extent of, or sue to recover, the profit – price less cost – that it would have realized on the initial sale had that sale been completed. Some courts and many scholars disagree, arguing that resale of the …
Rent Concessions And Illegal Contract Penalties In Texas, James P. George
Rent Concessions And Illegal Contract Penalties In Texas, James P. George
ExpressO
This article discusses penalty damages in residential leases in Texas. The sales pitch is a rent concession which is later reimposed if the buyer breaches. In contracts where the reimposed penalty reimburses the seller well beyond the consideration anticipated in the normal performance of the agreement, the reimposed discount is an illegal penalty. These contracts are pervasive but for the most part go unchalllenged.
Rent Concessions, Reimposable Discounts, And The Return Of Medieval Contract Penalties, James P. George
Rent Concessions, Reimposable Discounts, And The Return Of Medieval Contract Penalties, James P. George
ExpressO
This article discusses penalty damages in consumer contracts. It focuses on rent concessions in apartment leases, and includes lesser discussions of deferred payments and interest in the purchase of cars, furniture and appliances. The sales pitch is a deferral or discount which is later reimposed if the buyer breaches, with some contracts keying on small breaches such as late payment. In contracts where the reimposed penalty reimburses the seller well beyond the consideration anticipated in the normal performance of the agreement, the reimposed discount is an illegal penalty. These contracts are pervasive but for the most part go unchalllenged.