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Economics

Contracts

Institution
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Articles 91 - 95 of 95

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Caught Between Scylla And Charybdis: Law & Economics As A Useful Tool For Feminist Legal Theorists , Darren Bush Jan 1999

Caught Between Scylla And Charybdis: Law & Economics As A Useful Tool For Feminist Legal Theorists , Darren Bush

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law

No abstract provided.


A Contractual Approach To Data Privacy, Stephanos Bibas Jan 1994

A Contractual Approach To Data Privacy, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Mutual Versus Unilateral Mistake In Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Ian Ayres May 1993

Mutual Versus Unilateral Mistake In Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Ian Ayres

Ian Ayres

Courts sometimes allow contracts to be voidable because of mistakes in their basic assumptions. The common wisdom is that rescission is more likely to be granted if the mistake is mutual rather than unilateral---an incorrect belief common to both parties, not just to one. Rescission for mistake can be justified as a way to avoid inefficient transactions and to reduce the costs of collecting information on whether a mistake has been made. These reasons do not justify a general rule distinguishing between mutual and unilateral mistake.


The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton Jan 1989

The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agenc, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti Dec 1988

The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agenc, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Traditional agency theory assumes that the principal has no more information about the agent’s actions than the enforcement authorities have. This is unrealistic in many settings, and in repeated models, additional information possessed by the principal changes the nature of the problem. Such information can be used in implicit, self-enforcing contracts between principal and agent, that supplement the usual explicit contracts. This paper studies the way in which the two kinds of contracts are combined in constrained efficient equilibria of the agency supergame. The agent’s compensation is comprised of both guaranteed payments and voluntary bonuses from the principal. We give …