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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
An Equitable, Efficient, And Implementable Scheme To Control Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva
An Equitable, Efficient, And Implementable Scheme To Control Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo ratio of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in the proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that fully internalize the global externality. Although based on an admittedly ideal scheme, these results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for various forms of transfers in international agreements …
An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And The Coexistence Of Region And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva
An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And The Coexistence Of Region And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
We examine joint tradable permit markets as a self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g. smog and global warming). By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences.
An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And Coexistence Of Regional And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan
An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And Coexistence Of Regional And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.