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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium And The Comparison Of Information Structures, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium And The Comparison Of Information Structures, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. We describe a partial order on many player information structures — which we call individual sufficiency — under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of …
Correlated Equilibrium In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Correlated Equilibrium In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set of Bayes Nash equilibria and the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior information of the analyst …
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information …
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions. We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via …
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions. We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via …