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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Accommodation Or Deterrence In The Face Of Commercial Piracy: The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights (Ipr) Protections, Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar Nov 2011

Accommodation Or Deterrence In The Face Of Commercial Piracy: The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights (Ipr) Protections, Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In this paper, we address the issue of illegal copying or counterfeiting of the original product and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protections. The original product developer makes costly investment to deter piracy in a given regime of IPR protection. In the presence of a commercial pirate, we find that it is profitable for the original producer to accommodate the pirate when there is weak IPR protection, and deter when the IPR protection is strong. However, in the comparative statics analysis, we find that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal level of deterrence (chosen by the original producer) and …


Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith Jan 2011

Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took …


Reading, Writing, And Religion: Institutions And Human Capital Formation, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin Jan 2011

Reading, Writing, And Religion: Institutions And Human Capital Formation, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In this paper, we empirically test the role that religious and political institutions play in the accumulation of human capital. Using a new data set on literacy in colonial India, we find that Muslim literacy is negatively correlated with the proportion of Muslims in the district, although we find no similar result for Hindu literacy. We employ a theoretical model which suggests that districts which experienced a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority had more powerful and better funded religious authorities, who established religious schools which were less effective at promoting literacy on the margin than state schools. We …


Institutions, The Rise Of Commerce And The Persistence Of Laws: Interest Restrictions In Islam And Christianity, Jared Rubin Jan 2011

Institutions, The Rise Of Commerce And The Persistence Of Laws: Interest Restrictions In Islam And Christianity, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Why was economic development retarded in the Middle East relative to Western Europe, despite the Middle East being far ahead for centuries? A theoretical model inspired and substantiated by the history of interest restrictions suggests that this outcome emanates in part from the greater degree to which early Islamic political authorities derived legitimacy from religious authorities. This entailed a feedback mechanism in Europe in which the rise of commerce led to the relaxation of interest restrictions while also diminishing the Church's ability to legitimise political authorities. These interactions did not occur in the Islamic world despite equally amenable economic conditions.


Sweet Diversity: Colonial Goods And The Welfare Gains From Trade After 1492, Jonathan Hersh, Hans-Joachim Voth Jan 2011

Sweet Diversity: Colonial Goods And The Welfare Gains From Trade After 1492, Jonathan Hersh, Hans-Joachim Voth

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

When did overseas trade start to matter for living standards? Traditional real-wage indices suggest that living standards in Europe stagnated before 1800. In this paper, we argue that welfare rose substantially, but surreptitiously, because of an influx of new goods as a result of overseas trade. Colonial luxuries such as tea, coffee, and sugar transformed European diets after the discovery of America and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope. These goods became household items in many countries by the end of the 18th century. We use three different methods to calculate welfare gains based on price data and …


Banking In A Matching Model Of Money And Capital, Valerie R. Bencivenga, Gabriele Camera Jan 2011

Banking In A Matching Model Of Money And Capital, Valerie R. Bencivenga, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We introduce banks in a model of money and capital with trading frictions. Banks offer demand deposit contracts and hold primary assets to maximize depositors’ utility. If banks’ operating costs are small, banks reallocate liquidity eliminating idle balances and improving the allocation. At moderate costs, idle balances are reduced but not eliminated. At larger costs, banks are redundant. A central bank policy of paying interest on bank reserves can reverse inflation’s distortionary effects, and increase welfare, but only when costs are small. The threshold levels of banks’ costs increase with inflation, suggesting inflation and banks’ utilization are positively associated.


The Welfare Cost Of Inflation In Oecd Countries, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera Jan 2011

The Welfare Cost Of Inflation In Oecd Countries, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The welfare cost of anticipated inflation is quantified in a matching model of money calibrated to twenty-three different OECD countries for several sample periods. In most economies, given the common period 1978-1998, a representative agent would give up only a fraction of 1% of consumption to avoid 10% inflation. The welfare cost of inflation varies across countries, from a fraction of 0.1% in Japan, to more than 2% in Australia, reaching 6% with bargaining. The model fits poorly money demand data of several countries, however. The fit generally improves with longer sample periods. The results are fairly robust to variations …