Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
- Publication
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Grading In Games Of Status: Marking Exams And Setting Wages, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Grading In Games Of Status: Marking Exams And Setting Wages, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are often best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100,99,…,1), but instead by clumping them into coarse categories ( A,B,C ). When student abilities are disparate, the …
Grading In Games Of Status: Marking Exams And Setting Wages, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Grading In Games Of Status: Marking Exams And Setting Wages, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are often best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100,99,…,1), but instead by clumping them into coarse categories ( A,B,C ). When student abilities are disparate, the …
Prizes Versus Wages With Envy And Pride, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko
Prizes Versus Wages With Envy And Pride, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
Does "Work First" Work? The Long-Term Consequences Of Temporary Agency And Direct-Hire Job Placements, David H. Autor, Susan N. Houseman
Does "Work First" Work? The Long-Term Consequences Of Temporary Agency And Direct-Hire Job Placements, David H. Autor, Susan N. Houseman
Reports
A principal objective of the welfare reform act of 1996 (PRWORA) was to encourage welfare recipients to obtain jobs rapidly, a strategy termed "Work First." Much analysis shows that Work First raises the incidence of direct-hire and—in a sizable minority of cases—temporary-help agency jobs among welfare clients. But the effect of these jobs on longer term labor market outcomes, such as labor force participation, earnings, and welfare recidivism, is unknown. Because welfare recipients who obtain jobs rapidly are positively selected from the pool of all Work First participants, a simple comparison of long-term outcomes among job takers and non-takers is …
Educational Spillovers: Does One Size Fit All?, Robert Baumann, Raphael Solomon
Educational Spillovers: Does One Size Fit All?, Robert Baumann, Raphael Solomon
Economics Department Working Papers
In a search model of production, where agents accumulate heterogenous amounts of human capital, an individual worker’s wage depends on average human capital in the searching population. Based on this model, this paper estimates a Mincerian wage equation augmented with terms for average human capital. The authors find that there is a positive and significant spillover effect, but that the effect differs by gender and population group, as well as educational status. The differing spillover effects can only partially be explained by occupational choice.
New Turf For Organizing: Family Child Care Providers, Fred Brooks
New Turf For Organizing: Family Child Care Providers, Fred Brooks
SW Publications
Child-care providers are among the lowest paid wageworkers in the United States. Nationwide, less than 5 percent of child-care providers are represented by labor unions. This article addresses the question: How can family child-care providers be effectively organized? The author describes and analyzes Local 880 Service Employees International Union's effort to organize family child-care providers in Illinois. Adapting the grassroots-organizing model that they developed to organize homecare workers, Local 880 has over 2,200 signed authorization cards and over 1,500 members in the family child-care union. Even without formal recognition, the union won a pay increase for providers in 1999 and …
Living Wages And The Retention Of Homecare Workers In San Francisco, Candace Howes
Living Wages And The Retention Of Homecare Workers In San Francisco, Candace Howes
Economics Faculty Publications
This study records the impact on workforce retention of the nearly doubling of wages for homecare workers in San Francisco County over a 52-month period. Using descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis I find that the annual retention rate of new providers rose from 39 percent to 74 percent following significant wage and benefit increases and that a $1 increase in the wage rate from $8 an hour – the national average wage for homecare – would increase retention by 17 percentage points. I also show that adding health insurance increases the retention rate by 21 percentage points.
Future Job Prospects In Singapore, Hian Teck Hoon
Future Job Prospects In Singapore, Hian Teck Hoon
Research Collection School Of Economics
No abstract provided.