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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Extending Predation Analysis To Monopolist's Bundled Discounts Under Section 2: An Economic, Legal, And Comparative Perspective, Seth B. Chertok Dec 2005

Extending Predation Analysis To Monopolist's Bundled Discounts Under Section 2: An Economic, Legal, And Comparative Perspective, Seth B. Chertok

ExpressO

In LePage’s v. 3M, the Third Circuit decided the first case at the federal appellate court level that dealt with the subject of bundled discounts by a monopolist under Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the period following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. Prior to the decision in Brooke Group, the Third Circuit had only once before addressed this topic in Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Company. Smithkline is only significant because it nearly suggested that any bundled discount, regardless of whether above or below cost, was anti-competitive. …


The Accuracy And Manipulability Of Lost Profits Damages Calculations: Should The Trier Of Fact Be "Reasonably Certain"?, Jonathan T. Tomlin, David Merrell Sep 2005

The Accuracy And Manipulability Of Lost Profits Damages Calculations: Should The Trier Of Fact Be "Reasonably Certain"?, Jonathan T. Tomlin, David Merrell

ExpressO

The accuracy and manipulability of calculations for lost profits damages are critical determinants of the ability of harmed parties to receive just compensation in a wide range of legal cases including antitrust, fraud, false advertising, intellectual property infringement, and breach of contract. They are also important determinants of the deterrent effects of the law. Using a sample of over 5,000 U.S. firms, we show that simple damages methods are capable of being substantially inaccurate. We also show that damages methods in general are highly susceptible to manipulation. In the absence of reasonable justifications for why particular data sets and methods …


Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study Of Consumer Exemptions Cases, Bernard Trujillo Sep 2005

Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study Of Consumer Exemptions Cases, Bernard Trujillo

ExpressO

On April 20, 2005, the President of the United States signed a sweeping legislative overhaul of the consumer bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy reform legislation is based on an empirical assertion: that sophisticated debtors with the means to re-pay their debts were instead filing for bankruptcy and acquiring a discharge, thereby abusing the bankruptcy system.

This Article presents the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy court doctrine in consumer exemptions proceedings over a twenty-year period. The findings suggest a serious empirical flaw in the premise of the bankruptcy reform legislation. The study shows that the bankruptcy system minimizes abuse by …


Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor Sep 2005

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Is It A Subsidy? An Evaluation Of China's Currency Regime And Its Compliance With The Wto, Matthew R. Leviton Jun 2005

Is It A Subsidy? An Evaluation Of China's Currency Regime And Its Compliance With The Wto, Matthew R. Leviton

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


What Makes Asset Securitization "Inefficient"?, Kenji Yamazaki May 2005

What Makes Asset Securitization "Inefficient"?, Kenji Yamazaki

ExpressO

Despite the damage caused by the recent Enron scandal , the asset securitization market has been vibrant and has become a popular financing alternative . A number of academics emphasize its merits and suggest that it is a more favorable way of financing, and Congress’s proposal to make sales of asset in securitization immune from characterization as secured transactions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (the “Reform Act”) almost materialized when the Enron scandal hit the scene. Conversely, there have been accusations that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing because, for example, it fosters fraudulent transactions.

Why …


The Deregulation Of International Trucking In The European Union: Form And Effect, Francine Lafontaine, Laura M. Valeri Apr 2005

The Deregulation Of International Trucking In The European Union: Form And Effect, Francine Lafontaine, Laura M. Valeri

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This paper examines how the deregulation of the international road transport industry in Western Europe has affected 1- the total quantity of cross-border road transport in the region; 2- the degree to which shippers outsource rather than integrate vertically their cross-border transport needs; and 3- the extent to which different countries participate in international road freight transport in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, we find that deregulation has had a large positive effect on the amount of international road transport net of the effect of the trade ties that grew over time among European Union countries. Moreover, consistent with the fact …


From St. Ives To Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion Of The Medieval 'Law Merchant', Stephen E. Sachs Mar 2005

From St. Ives To Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion Of The Medieval 'Law Merchant', Stephen E. Sachs

ExpressO

Modern advocates of corporate self-regulation have drawn unlikely inspiration from the Middle Ages. On the traditional view of history, medieval merchants who wandered from fair to fair were not governed by domestic laws, but by their own lex mercatoria, or "law merchant." This law, which uniformly regulated commerce across Europe, was supposedly produced by an autonomous merchant class, interpreted in private courts, and enforced through private sanctions rather than state coercion. Contemporary writers have treated global corporations as descendants of these itinerant traders, urging them to replace conflicting national laws with a law of their own creation. The standard history …


Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson Mar 2005

Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson

ExpressO

This article presents the first in-depth exploration of third-party closing opinions, a common but curious – and potentially troubling -- feature of U.S. business law practice. Third-party closing opinions are letters delivered at the closing of most large transactions by the attorney for one party (e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender) offering limited assurance that the transaction will have legal force and effect.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of legal opinions are delivered every week. Yet, lawyers often complain that they create needless risk and cost, and produce little benefit. Closing opinions thus pose a basic question: …


Patterns In A Complex System: An Empirical Study Of Valuation In Business Bankruptcy Cases, Bernard Trujillo Mar 2005

Patterns In A Complex System: An Empirical Study Of Valuation In Business Bankruptcy Cases, Bernard Trujillo

ExpressO

This Article applies complex systems research methods to explore the characteristics of the bankruptcy legal system, presenting the results of an empirical study of twenty years of bankruptcy court valuation doctrine in business cramdown cases. These data provide solid descriptions of how courts exercise their discretion in valuing firms and assets.

This Article accomplishes two objectives: First, using scientific methodology, this Article explains the content of bankruptcy valuation doctrine. Second, this Article uses doctrine as a variable to explore system dynamics that govern the processes of change over time.

Significant findings include (i) courts tend to “split the difference” in …


The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer Feb 2005

The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer

ExpressO

Managers of buyout funds typically offer their investors an 8% preferred return on their investment before they take a share of any additional profits. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, rarely offer a preferred return. Instead, VCs take their cut from the first dollar of nominal profits. This disparity between venture funds and buyout funds is especially striking because the contracts that determine fund organization and compensation are otherwise very similar. The missing preferred return might suggest that agency costs pose a larger problem in venture capital than previously thought. Is the missing preferred return evidence, perhaps, that VCs are …