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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2005

Economics

Yale University

Ex Post Equilibrium

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Information In Mechanism Design, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki Aug 2005

Information In Mechanism Design, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work.


Information In Mechanism Design, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki Aug 2005

Information In Mechanism Design, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.