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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Peter Cramton
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.
Quality Bargaining And Intermediate Goods Protection, Neil Campbell
Quality Bargaining And Intermediate Goods Protection, Neil Campbell
Neil Campbell
This paper offers an explanation for the proposition that removing protection from a firm can induce an improvement in product quality. In a vertically separated industry the quality of the final good is dependent on the quality of the intermediate goods used in its production. This model is used to consider removal of protection from the upstream firm (the supplier) which gives the downstream firm (the assembler) greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign supplier becomes more attractive.
Bargaining With Incomplete Information, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
Bargaining With Incomplete Information, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
Peter Cramton
A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information. The chapter begins with an analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex post efficiency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist. The classic problems of efficient trade with one-sided incomplete information …
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.
The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. We examine how the optimal auction problem changes when these assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no resale assumption, we assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple object model with independent signals, we …
Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.
Mecanismo De Regulación Aplicado Al Servicio Urbano De Abastecimiento De Agua, Max Garcia
Mecanismo De Regulación Aplicado Al Servicio Urbano De Abastecimiento De Agua, Max Garcia
Max Garcia Sanchez
No abstract provided.
Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Modeling The Effects Of Area Closure And Tax Policies: A Spatial-Temporal Model Of The Hawaii Longline Fishery, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Keiichi Nemoto
Modeling The Effects Of Area Closure And Tax Policies: A Spatial-Temporal Model Of The Hawaii Longline Fishery, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Keiichi Nemoto
Ujjayant Chakravorty
We develop an economic model for a multi-species fishery that incorporates the spatial and temporal distribution of effort and fish stocks. Catchability coefficients and initial stocks are estimated from catch and effort data for each specific location. Vessels are allocated over space and time to locations of maximum profit, which decline with harvest because of stock externalities. A supply function for labor allocation in the fishery is estimated. The simulated model is applied to the Hawaii longline fishery. The economic impacts of regulatory policies, such as reduction of inshore gear conflict and conservation of offshore turtle populations, are examined.