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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Noise Trader Risk In Financial Markets, J. Bradford Delong
Noise Trader Risk In Financial Markets, J. Bradford Delong
J. Bradford DeLong
No abstract provided.
Cooperation In A Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma With Ostracism, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, David Hirshleifer
Cooperation In A Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma With Ostracism, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, David Hirshleifer
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners' Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group's members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast, putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, we show that ostracism can be effective in promoting cooperation with either finite or infinite rounds of play. The model can be applied to games other than the Prisoners' Dilemma, and ostracism can enforce inefficient as well …
Product Quality With Information Dissemination And Switching Costs, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Product Quality With Information Dissemination And Switching Costs, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Klein and Leffler (1981) construct a model in which expected future prices exceed marginal costs so that sellers are willing to maintain high quality for the sake of future profits. How profits are dissapated under free entry, and whether there is a continuum of equilibria, are questions not fully resolved. I contstruct a formal model simpler than any now existing in which free entry and exogenous fixed costs uniquely determine the price of output and the amount sold per firm.
Diverting The Coasean River: Incentive Schemes To Reduce Unemployment Spells, John Donohue
Diverting The Coasean River: Incentive Schemes To Reduce Unemployment Spells, John Donohue
John Donohue
No abstract provided.
Direct Tests Of The Rational Expectations Hypothesis: A Study Of Italian Entrepreneurs’ Inflationary Expectations (1980-1988), Claudio Lupi
Direct Tests Of The Rational Expectations Hypothesis: A Study Of Italian Entrepreneurs’ Inflationary Expectations (1980-1988), Claudio Lupi
Claudio Lupi
The primary concern of this paper is to test the rational expectations hypothesis for Italian entrepreneurs' inflationary expectations between 1980 and 1988 using monthly observed expectations. Particular care is devoted to analyzing the problems arising when multiperiod expectations and a nonwhite noise measurement error in the expectations series are considered. The empirical analysis is carried out using cross correlations on ARIMA residuals and transfer function models. This technique seems to be particularly appealing for rationality testing.