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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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1983

Selected Works

Groves-Clarke mechanism

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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Independence Of Allocative Efficiency From Distribution In The Theory Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes Oct 1983

Independence Of Allocative Efficiency From Distribution In The Theory Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes

Ted C Bergstrom

When is the Pareto optimal amount of public goods independent of income distribution? Subject to some regularity conditions, the answer is when preferences of every individual i can be represented by a utility function of the form U(X_i,Y)=A(Y)X_i+B_i(Y) where X_i is i's consumption of private goods and Y is the amount of public goods.