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Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Simple Economies With Multiple Equilibria, Ted C. Bergstrom, Ken-Ichi Shimomura, Takehiko Yamato Jan 2009

Simple Economies With Multiple Equilibria, Ted C. Bergstrom, Ken-Ichi Shimomura, Takehiko Yamato

Ted C Bergstrom

This paper studies a general class of pure exchange economies that have multiple equilibria, which extend an example presented by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik. For such economies, we find easily verified conditions that determine whether there are multiple equilibria. We also provide simple methods for constructing economies in which arbitrary pre-specified sets of prices are equilibria. These economies have simple comparative statics, since prices at interior competitive equilibrium depend on the parameters of utility but not on the endowment quantities.


The Economics Of Ecology Journals, Ted C. Bergstrom, Carl T. Bergstrom Jan 2007

The Economics Of Ecology Journals, Ted C. Bergstrom, Carl T. Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

Large commercial publishers charge dramatically higher prices to institutions than do non-profit publishers. These price differences do not reflect quality as measured by citation rate or pages. We discuss effect of prices and citations on number of library subscriptions and offer an explanation for why competition has not been able to erode the price difference between commercial and non profit journals.


Benefit-Cost In A Benevolent Society, Ted Bergstrom Mar 2006

Benefit-Cost In A Benevolent Society, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

How should benefit-cost analysis account for the value that benevolent individuals place on other people's pleasure from public goods? When adding up the benefits to be compared with costs, should we sum the private valuations, the altruistic valuations, or something else? This paper proposes a partial answer and offers some suggestions for benefit-cost practitioners.


Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications, Ted Bergstrom, Mark Bagnoli Jan 2005

Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications, Ted Bergstrom, Mark Bagnoli

Ted C Bergstrom

In many applications,assumptions about the log-concavity of a probability distribution allow just enough special structure to yield a workable theory.This paper catalogs a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or log-convexity of probability density functions,distribution functions,reliability functions,and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature. (The current draft corrects a typo in Table 3.)


A Survey Of Theories Of The Family, Ted Bergstrom Jun 1995

A Survey Of Theories Of The Family, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

This review explores the theory of household technology and the associated possibilities for distributing utility among household members. It also explores decision theory within the household, drawing on standard consumer decision theory. The review discusses models of equilbrium in which families are formed by persons voluntarily choosing mates. This theory is analogous to ``Tiebout theory'' in urban economics, where the objects of choice include not only the amount of public goods supplied in each city, but also which individuals live in each place. An aspect of family life that has fewer parallels in the economics of market economies is intrafamilial …


Do Governments Spend Too Much?, Ted Bergstrom Jun 1979

Do Governments Spend Too Much?, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

This paper extends Bowen's theorem on the efficiency of majority-chosen public expenditures. It also discusses situations under which majority rule is likely to lead to inefficient outcomes.


Regulation Of Externalities, Ted C. Bergstrom Jan 1976

Regulation Of Externalities, Ted C. Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

This paper presents a general equilibrium model with marketable pollution permits. It shows that competitive equilibrium with marketable permits is "conditionally optimal" in the sense that no Pareto improvement can be achieved without changing pollution standards. The paper also explores mechanisms for choosing efficient aggregate pollution levels.


The Use Of Markets To Control Pollution, Ted C. Bergstrom Jan 1973

The Use Of Markets To Control Pollution, Ted C. Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

No abstract provided.