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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris
Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct model of the buyers’ beliefs. The designer evaluates a given auction design by the lowest expected revenue that would be generated across all models of buyers’ information that are consistent with the common prior and across all Bayesian equilibria. An optimal auction for such a seller is constructed, as is a worst-case …
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an “information designer” who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many players and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.