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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Edgeworth, Cournot And Walrasian Cores Of An Economy, Martin Shubik
The Edgeworth, Cournot And Walrasian Cores Of An Economy, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.
An ‘Average’ Lyapunov Convexity Theorem And Some Core Equivalence Results, Lin Zhou
An ‘Average’ Lyapunov Convexity Theorem And Some Core Equivalence Results, Lin Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
I prove an “average” version of the Lyapunov convexity theorem and apply it to establish some core equivalence results for an atomless economy.
Strictly Fair Allocations In Large Exchange Economies, Lin Zhou
Strictly Fair Allocations In Large Exchange Economies, Lin Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allocation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies. We prove that when agents’ utility functions are differentiable, the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal-income Walrasian equilibria. This is shown using both the “limit theorem” approach the “limit economy” approach. We also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector. These results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal-income Walrasian equilibria in terms of both economic efficiency and economic equity.
Gold, Liquidity And Secured Loans In A Multi-Stage Economy. Part Ii. Many Durables, Land And Gold, Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
Gold, Liquidity And Secured Loans In A Multi-Stage Economy. Part Ii. Many Durables, Land And Gold, Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a previous paper (Shubik and Yao, 1988) we examined a multistage exchange economy with m perishable goods and one infinitely durable gold used as money. we considered an economy without credit and one with one hundred percent secured loans. In this paper we consider an economy with m(1) goods which have finite lives and m(2) goods which are of infinite durability. Historically the two durables which have been prominent in economic activity have been gold and land, although one might wish to include platinum and some other items.
The Transactions Cost Of Money (A Strategic Game Analysis), Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
The Transactions Cost Of Money (A Strategic Game Analysis), Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The payments system of a modern economy is a peculiar mix of technological and institutional factors. Trade takes time and involves some form of money or credit. Going to the bank or arranging credits is expensive. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) address the costs of transactions. However both the Baumol and the Tobin analysis was carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Here we address the task of considering the costs of banking in a closed strategic market game.
Gold, Liquidity And Secured Loans In A Multistage Economy. Part I: Gold As Money, Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
Gold, Liquidity And Secured Loans In A Multistage Economy. Part I: Gold As Money, Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A multiperiod exchange economy with gold used both as money and as jewelry is examined in this paper. The existence of Nash equilibria is proved for the market games with finitely many traders as well as the games with a continuum of traders. For market games with a continuum of traders at infinite horizon, the existence of stationary Nash equilibria has been proved under the assumption that gold is properly distributed at the beginning or a secured loan between traders is available.
Enough Commodity Money And The Selection Of A Unique Competitive Equilibrium, Martin Shubik
Enough Commodity Money And The Selection Of A Unique Competitive Equilibrium, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Suppose that we reformulate the exchange economy as a strategic market game. As all purchases are paid for in cash it is possible to attach precise meaning to what is meant by enough money. As the game is a single simultaneous bid and offered at m trading posts and m prices are all simultaneously determined, in essence the trading technology is completely specified.