Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Treatment Of Saltcedar (Tamarix Spp.): Economics And Feasibility, Christopher L. Thompson

All Graduate Theses and Dissertations, Spring 1920 to Summer 2023

The invasive species Saltcedar is affecting water and land resources throughout the western states of America. Because of great water use capabilities and other ecosystem detriments, Saltcedar has been targeted for treatment.

For successful management of Saltcedar, individual landowners need to be aware of the costs and benefits of treating Saltcedar. Eleven of the most commonly reported treatment methods were evaluated for firm level economic feasibility. Evaluated on the basis of treatment cost, treatment effectiveness, Saltcedar water-use, and re-vegetation water-use, a production plan of ten years was created for each treatment method. Some treatment methods required re-treatment and were evaluated …

An Equitable, Efficient, And Implementable Scheme To Control Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva

Applied Economics Faculty Publications

We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo ratio of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in the proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that fully internalize the global externality. Although based on an admittedly ideal scheme, these results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for various forms of transfers in international agreements …

An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And The Coexistence Of Region And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva

Applied Economics Faculty Publications

We examine joint tradable permit markets as a self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g. smog and global warming). By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences.

An Efficient Mechanism To Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers And Coexistence Of Regional And Global Pollution Permit Markets, Arthur J. Caplan

Applied Economics Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.