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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons From Regulating Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan
Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons From Regulating Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
Many jurisdictions around the world, includingAsia, have corporate governance codes largely based on the transnational codedrafted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).The core ideas underpinning the OECD’s principles of corporate governance are boardindependence and proper management of conflicts of interest. These ideas, drawnfrom the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, are designed to protectcompanies and their shareholders. However, the question remains as to whether atransnational corporate governance code is always appropriate and effective, particularlywhen the kinds of companies listed on the stock exchange significantly differfrom the Anglo-American model. In this article, we examine Hong Kong andSingapore, two Asian …
Singapore Company Law And The Economy: Reciprocal Influence Over 50 Years, Vincent Ooi, Cheng Han Tan
Singapore Company Law And The Economy: Reciprocal Influence Over 50 Years, Vincent Ooi, Cheng Han Tan
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
A strong reciprocal relationship has existed between Singapore Company Law (SCL) and the economy since Independence in 1965. Swift Parliamentary responses to economic events and successful implementation of Government policies has made it possible to clearly attribute cause and effect to statutory amendments and economic events in turn, proving the reciprocal relationship between the two. The first theme of this article seeks to explain the fundamental characteristics of SCL that have resulted in such an unusually strong reciprocal relationship: (1) Autochthonous nature of SCL; (2) Responsive nature of legislation; and (3) Government control at multiple levels of implementation. The second …
The (Re)Introduction Of Dual-Class Share Structures In Hong Kong: A Historical And Comparative Analysis, Hui Robin Huang, Wei Zhang, Siu Cheung Kelvin Lee
The (Re)Introduction Of Dual-Class Share Structures In Hong Kong: A Historical And Comparative Analysis, Hui Robin Huang, Wei Zhang, Siu Cheung Kelvin Lee
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
In April 2018, Hong Kong issued new listing rules to introduce the dual-class share structure, also known as weighted voting rights (WVR), under which a special class of shareholders’ voting rights are conferred disproportionately with respect to their equity interest. The WVR was used in Hong Kong in the 1980s but was banned in 1989. The debate on the WVR was rekindled by the Alibaba event in 2013. The WVR structure has benefits and costs. Thus, Hong Kong lays down relevant supporting mechanisms, including entry requirements, disclosure requirements and safeguard requirements. The WVR regime in Hong Kong appears to be …
Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy
Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Consensus due to similar personal backgrounds, lack of diversity in views and failure to see things from others’ perspective can lead to bad decisions.
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
This article examines the impact of a one-size-fits-all corporate governance code on smaller listed firms, which should have fewer resources to hire more qualified independent directors for their boards and board committees. After examining data from a sample of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore, we find some limited support for these resources-based arguments. While smaller firms do not necessarily have a lower proportion of board members who are independent directors, some evidence suggests that smaller firms do pay less to independent directors and that these directors have to serve on multiple board committees. Although many larger firms also …