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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Test For Efficiency In The Supply Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Judith Roberts, Daniel Rubinfeld, Perry Shapiro
A Test For Efficiency In The Supply Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Judith Roberts, Daniel Rubinfeld, Perry Shapiro
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper conducts an empirical test of whether local governments spend more or less than a Pareto optimal amount on local public goods. Our procedure is to check whether the Samuelson first order conditions ) for efficient provision of public goods are satisfied.
On The Private Provision Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Hal Varian, Larry Blume
On The Private Provision Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Hal Varian, Larry Blume
Ted C Bergstrom
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A smallredistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds …
Independence Of Allocative Efficiency From Distribution In The Theory Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes
Independence Of Allocative Efficiency From Distribution In The Theory Of Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes
Ted C Bergstrom
When is the Pareto optimal amount of public goods independent of income distribution? Subject to some regularity conditions, the answer is when preferences of every individual i can be represented by a utility function of the form U(X_i,Y)=A(Y)X_i+B_i(Y) where X_i is i's consumption of private goods and Y is the amount of public goods.
Gorman And Musgrave Are Dual: An Antipodean Theorem On Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes
Gorman And Musgrave Are Dual: An Antipodean Theorem On Public Goods, Ted Bergstrom, Richard Cornes
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper finds the conditions under which an allocation branch can determine the efficient amount of public goods to produce, independently of the distribution of private goods. The result is similar to that found in our Econometrica paper, but uses a quite different method--solving a differential equation.
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, Ted Bergstrom
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
H.R. Bowen showed that if voters have equal tax shares and if marginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed, then majority voting leads to efficient provision of public goods. These conditions are not likely to apply in a community with asymmetric income distribution. This paper defines a new idea for public goods allocation, a "pseudo-Lindahl equilibrium" which combines majority voting with tax rates that depend on income and other observable characteristices in such a way that the majority rule outcome is Pareto optimal for an interesting class of societies. The informational requirements for implementing pseudo-Lindahl are much less stringent than …
Collective Choice And The Lindahl Allocation Method, Ted Bergstrom
Collective Choice And The Lindahl Allocation Method, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper contains a proof of the existence of Lindahl equilibrium in a very general model of externalities, public goods, and non-selfish preferences. The trick in this paper is to treat all goods as pure public goods, with private goods and their competitive prices treated as special cases induced by special structure within the public goods, Lindahl framework.
On Efficient Provision Of Social Overhead Goods, Ted Bergstrom
On Efficient Provision Of Social Overhead Goods, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper was my attempt to build a theory of "public factors of production" such as scientific knowledge and to see whether there is any way that Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory can cope with the nonconvexities that arise. I propose that the economy might be partitioned into provision of "social overhead goods" and ordinary goods in such a way that given the quantities of social overhead goods, the remaining activities satisfy the assumptions needed for the existence of competitive equilibrium. I proposed and examined a notion of "Lindahl-Hotelling equilibrium" in which individuals were assigned Lindahl prices for the social overhead …