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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distribution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for …
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy- proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not random dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition (introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dictatorship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is …