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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Antitrust (1)
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- Commercialisation (1)
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- Demography and Birth Timing (1)
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- Dynamic capabilities (1)
- Games in partition function form (1)
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- Timing of births (1)
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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Born (Again) On The First Of July: Another Experiment In Birth Timing, Joshua S. Gans, Andrew Leigh
Born (Again) On The First Of July: Another Experiment In Birth Timing, Joshua S. Gans, Andrew Leigh
Joshua S Gans
In an earlier paper (Gans and Leigh, 2006a), we analysed the effect of the introduction of the $3,000 “Baby Bonus” for children born on or after July 1, 2004. We demonstrated that parents behaved strategically in order to receive this benefit, with over 1000 births being “moved” so as to ensure that their parents were eligible for the Baby Bonus. On July 1, 2006, the payment was increased by $834. In this paper, we analyse births in 2006, and find that again, a large number of births were moved. We estimate that over 600 births were moved from June 2006 …
Start-Up Commercialisation Strategy And Innovative Dynamics, Joshua S. Gans
Start-Up Commercialisation Strategy And Innovative Dynamics, Joshua S. Gans
Joshua S Gans
This paper endogenises a start-up’s choice between competitive and cooperative commercialisation in a dynamic environment. It is demonstrated that, depending upon firms’ dynamic capabilities, there may or may not be gains to trade between incumbents and start-ups in a cumulative innovation environment; that is, start-ups may not be adequately compensated for losses in future innovative potential. Because of this, there is no clear relationship between observed inter-industry innovation and commercialisation choice unless dynamic capabilities of firms are taken into account. In addition, the analysis demonstrates subtle and novel insights into the relationship between dynamic capabilities and rates of innovation.
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine C. De Fontenay, Joshua S. Gans
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine C. De Fontenay, Joshua S. Gans
Joshua S Gans
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. The resulting division is akin to the Myerson-Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining firm-worker negotiations and buyer-seller networks.
Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?, Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman
Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?, Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman
Joshua S Gans
This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations – efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers – who have the option to use the monopolist’s complementary good – do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner …