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Selected Works

Dorothea Herreiner

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Inequality Aversion And Efficiency With Ordinal And Cardinal Social Preferences – An Experimental Study, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe Oct 2013

Inequality Aversion And Efficiency With Ordinal And Cardinal Social Preferences – An Experimental Study, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe

Dorothea Herreiner

In this paper, we report on a series of free-form bargaining experiments inwhich two players have to distribute four indivisible goods among themselves. In one treatment, players are informed about the monetary payoffs associated with each bundle of goods; in a second treatment only the ordinal ranking of the bundles is given. We find that in both cases, inequality aversion plays a prominent role. In the ordinal treatment, individuals apparently use the ranks in the respective preference orderings over bundles of goods as a substitute for the unknown monetary value. Allocations that distribute the value (money or ranks, respectively) most …


Distributing Indivisible Goods Fairly: Evidence From A Questionnaire Study, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe Oct 2013

Distributing Indivisible Goods Fairly: Evidence From A Questionnaire Study, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe

Dorothea Herreiner

We report the results of a questionnaire study on the fair distribution ofindivisible goods. We collected data from three different subject pools, first- and secondyear students majoring in economics, law students, and advanced economics students with some background knowledge of fairness theories. The purpose of this study is to assess the empirical relevance of various fairness criteria such as inequality aversion, the utilitarian principle of maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, the Rawlsian “maximin” principle of maximizing the payoff of the worst-off individual, and the criterion of envy-freeness (in the sense of Foley, 1967).


Envy Freeness In Experimental Fair Division Problems, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe Oct 2013

Envy Freeness In Experimental Fair Division Problems, Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens Puppe

Dorothea Herreiner

Envy is sometimes suggested as an underlying motive in the assessment ofdifferent economic allocations. In the theoretical literature on fair division, following Foley (1967), the term “envy” refers to an intrapersonal comparison of different consumption bundles. By contrast, in its everyday use “envy” involves interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems in which inter- and intrapersonal criteria can be distinguished. We find that interpersonal comparisons play the dominant role. The effect of the intrapersonal criterion of envy-freeness is limited to situations in which other fairness criteria are not applicable.