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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Cabinet Reshuffles And Ministerial Drift, Indridi H. Indridason, Christopher Kam
Cabinet Reshuffles And Ministerial Drift, Indridi H. Indridason, Christopher Kam
Indridi H Indridason
We model policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as delegation between the prime minister and her cabinet ministers. We show that cabinet reshuffl#31;es can be pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. Our work thus explains why prime ministers would want to resort to reshu#31;ffles: cabinet reshuffl#31;es reduce the moral hazard facing ministers. This answer both augments and distinguishes our work from traditional perspectives on reshuffl#31;es that have emphasized the deleterious effects of reshuffl#31;es on ministerial capacity, and also from recent work that casts reshuffl#31;es as solutions to …
Competition & Turnout: The Majority Run-Off As A Natural Experiment, Indridi Indridason
Competition & Turnout: The Majority Run-Off As A Natural Experiment, Indridi Indridason
Indridi H Indridason
Run-off elections offer certain advantages for the study of political behavior over other electoral systems. This paper exploits the fact that run-off elections resemble a natural experiment to study the effects of competitiveness on voter turnout. The literature offers several explanations of the determinants of voter turnout. In run-off elections most of these factors can be assumed to be constant between the two ballots. Run-off elections, thus, provide an opportunity to evaluate the insights offered by rational choice theories of voter turnout. The results of the first ballot inform voters about the competitiveness of the race, which influences their propensity …
When To Run And When To Hide: Electoral Coordination And Exit, Indridi Indridason
When To Run And When To Hide: Electoral Coordination And Exit, Indridi Indridason
Indridi H Indridason
Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordination is also the causal mechanism behind any explanation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. I present a dynamic model of electoral coordination with candidate exit. The model extends two important results from the literature to a dynamic setting. The extension of Duverger's Law and the median-voter theorem also offers a simultaneous prediction of the number of parties and their ideological positions. Coordination failure is shown to be possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
To Dissent Or Not To Dissent? Informative Dissent And Parliamentary Government, Indridi Indridason
To Dissent Or Not To Dissent? Informative Dissent And Parliamentary Government, Indridi Indridason
Indridi H Indridason
Legislative dissent has detrimental effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party label for re-election, which value in turn depends in part on the party’s reputation of cohesiveness. Commonly dissent has been attributed to “extreme” preferences. I provide an informational rationale for dissent. Costly dissent allows the legislator to credibly signal information about his constituency’s preferences to the Cabinet. As a result the Cabinet can better calibrate its policies with the electorate’s preferences. Dissent is shown to depend on policy preferences as well a the legislators’ electoral strength, electoral volatility, and the cost of dissent. Finally, …