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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Entrepreneurship And Social Endeavours In Singapore, Wee Liang Tan Oct 2003

Entrepreneurship And Social Endeavours In Singapore, Wee Liang Tan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Many people would confine entrepreneurship to the business arena and entrepreneurs to profit enterprises. In truth, entrepreneurship can extend to all aspects of human activity as defined by Raymond Kao as “the process of doing something new and/or different to create wealth for oneself and to add value to the society” (Kao, 1993). Apart from entrepreneurship that is solely “for profit” and in the business sphere, there is social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship spans a continuum of community-based enterprises and entrepreneurial activities by volunteers for the good of their communities. It also includes philanthropic acts by successful individuals. While many may …


Role Of Government In Attracting And Inviting Investment From The Private Sector: Extrapolations From The Singapore Experience, Caroline Yeoh, Siang Yeung Wong, Adeline Li Feng Kwan Aug 2003

Role Of Government In Attracting And Inviting Investment From The Private Sector: Extrapolations From The Singapore Experience, Caroline Yeoh, Siang Yeung Wong, Adeline Li Feng Kwan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

No abstract provided.


Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen Jan 2003

Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen

Research Collection School Of Economics

We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following requirement: if changing one buyer’s type, while keeping everyone else’s types the same, changes this buyer’s allocation then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or relatively less unattractive) to this buyer. We also establish a price characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.