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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Georgia State University

PMAP Publications

2019

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Taking Control Of Regulations: How International Advocacy Ngos Shape The Regulatory Environments Of Their Target Countries, Andrew Heiss Sep 2019

Taking Control Of Regulations: How International Advocacy Ngos Shape The Regulatory Environments Of Their Target Countries, Andrew Heiss

PMAP Publications

A wave of legislative and regulatory crackdown on international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) has constricted the legal environment for foreign advocacy groups interested in influencing domestic and global policy. Although the legal space for advocacy is shrinking, many INGOs have continued their work and found creative ways to adapt to these restrictions, sometimes even reshaping the regulatory environments of their target countries in their favor. In this article, I explore what enables INGOs to cope with and reshape their regulatory environments. I bridge international relations and interest group studies to examine the interaction between INGO resource configurations and institutional arrangements. I …


Municipal Government Form And Budget Outcomes: Political Responsiveness, Bureaucratic Insulation, And The Budgetary Solvency Of Cities, Benedict S. Jimenez Aug 2019

Municipal Government Form And Budget Outcomes: Political Responsiveness, Bureaucratic Insulation, And The Budgetary Solvency Of Cities, Benedict S. Jimenez

PMAP Publications

One of the fundamental questions in democratic governance is whether policies are best decided by elected officials or by appointed bureaucrat-experts. The study examines this issue in the context of how municipal government form influences government-wide budgetary solvency. Government form creates distinct incentives for executive action that shape budget outcomes. In mayor-council governments, the elected executive’s desire to be reelected increases responsiveness to voters’ preferences. Vote maximization incentivizes the adoption of policies that are popular among voters but can lead to budgetary imbalance. In contrast, the appointed executive in the council-manager form is interested in career advancement, which she achieves …