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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Psychology

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WellBeing International

Series

2009

Emotions

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan Jan 2009

Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan

Sentience Collection

It is generally accepted that all the vertebrates and some of the invertebrates (those with large neural ganglia such as the cephalopods) are capable of subjective experiences. Amongst those experiences are the subjective, affective states, sometimes called 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The strong negative feelings are often lumped together as 'suffering' and the positive feelings as 'pleasure'. I have argued for many years that animal welfare/well-being is completely dependent on what the animal feels (Duncan, 1993, 1996, 2002). An animal's well-being is decreased by experiencing suffering and increased by experiencing pleasure. It's as simple as that.


Distress In Animals: Its Recognition And A Hypothesis For Its Assessment, David B. Morton Jan 2009

Distress In Animals: Its Recognition And A Hypothesis For Its Assessment, David B. Morton

Sentience Collection

This essay deals with the recognition of non-painful emotional experiences in animals, how they relate to animal wellbeing and animal welfare, and how they can be assessed, monitored and mitigated. While it is written often from a mammalian perspective, the general principles will apply to all animals that are sentient.


Politics Or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews Jan 2009

Politics Or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties To Animals, Kristin Andrews

Sentience Collection

Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional development as well …