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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Theories And Practices Of Islamic Finance And Exchange Laws: Poverty Of Interest, Ahmed E. Souaiaia Oct 2014

Theories And Practices Of Islamic Finance And Exchange Laws: Poverty Of Interest, Ahmed E. Souaiaia

Ahmed E SOUAIAIA

While Islamic scriptures clearly prohibit profiting from the poor, supposedly sharī'ah-compliant Islamic financial and exchange laws circumvent prohibitions and limitations on ribā, monopolism, debt, and risk while failing to address the fundamental purpose behind the prohibitions—mitigating poverty. This work provides a historical survey of the principles that shape Islamic finance and exchange laws, reviews classical and modern interpretations and practices in the banking and exchange sectors, and suggests a normative model rooted in the interpretation of Islamic sources of law reconstructed from paradigmatic cases. Financial systems that overlook the nexus between poverty and usury harm both the economy and poor …


Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2014

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …


Implementing Dodd-Frank: A Review Of The Cftc‟S Rulemaking Process: Testimony, Michael Greenberger Mar 2012

Implementing Dodd-Frank: A Review Of The Cftc‟S Rulemaking Process: Testimony, Michael Greenberger

Michael Greenberger

The Relationship of Unregulated OTC Derivatives to the Meltdown. It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized, and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008. Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized or non-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing investments. Moreover, the many undercapitalized insurers of that collapsing market had other multi-trillion dollar …


U.S. Appellate Court Ruling Deals Fatal Blow To Argentina Brady Bond Debt Swap, Mark J. Calaguas Jun 2011

U.S. Appellate Court Ruling Deals Fatal Blow To Argentina Brady Bond Debt Swap, Mark J. Calaguas

Mark J Calaguas

No abstract provided.


Code, Crash, And Open Source: The Outsourcing Of Financial Regulation To Risk Models And The Global Financial Crisis, Erik F. Gerding Jan 2009

Code, Crash, And Open Source: The Outsourcing Of Financial Regulation To Risk Models And The Global Financial Crisis, Erik F. Gerding

Erik F. Gerding

The widespread use computer-based risk models in the financial industry in the last two decades enabled the marketing of more complex financial products to consumers, the growth of securitization and derivatives, and the development of sophisticated risk management strategies by financial institutions. Over this same period, regulators increasingly delegated or outsourced vast responsibility for regulating risk in both consumer finance and financial markets to these private industry models. The proprietary risk models of financial institutions thus came to serve as a “new financial code” that regulated transfers of risk among consumers, financial institutions, and investors.

The spectacular failure of financial …