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One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, Michael W. Carroll Oct 2009

One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, Michael W. Carroll

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The United States and its trading partners have adopted cultural and innovation policies under which the government grants one-size-fits-all patents and copyrights to inventors and authors. On a global basis, the reasons for doing so vary, but in the United States granting intellectual property rights has been justified as the principal means of promoting innovation and cultural progress. Until recently, however, few have questioned the wisdom of using such blunt policy instruments to promote progress in a wide range of industries in which the economics of innovation varies considerably.

Provisionally accepting the assumptions of the traditional economic case for intellectual …


Cases And Materials On Privatization, Alexander Volokh Sep 2009

Cases And Materials On Privatization, Alexander Volokh

Alexander Volokh

These are the materials for my course on privatization, and the draft for an eventual casebook.


Bailouts, Buy-Ins, And Ballyhoo, Robert C. Hockett Apr 2009

Bailouts, Buy-Ins, And Ballyhoo, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The bailout strategy now being pursued by Treasury under the recently authorized Troubled Asset Relief Plan, if “strategy” it can be called, remains obscure and erratic at best. All the while markets remain jittery and credit remains tight, as the underlying source of our present financial jitters—continued decline in the housing market and still mounting foreclosures—goes unaddressed. This piece proposes an interesting and novel approach to solving the financial problem. If it works out, it would eventually minimize the cost to the government.


Judicial Adherence To A Minimum Core Approach To Socio-Economic Rights – A Comparative Perspective, Joie Chowdhury Mar 2009

Judicial Adherence To A Minimum Core Approach To Socio-Economic Rights – A Comparative Perspective, Joie Chowdhury

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

Today’s world is witness to extraordinary inequality and the most desperate poverty. Millions of people across the world have no access to adequate food or water, basic health care or minimum levels of education. There are many avenues through which to approach the issue of improving socio-economic conditions. Courts, especially recently, have in certain countries, been seeking to ameliorate these conditions, to some extent, through the means of socio-economic rights adjudication.

For courts to effectively empower people to realize their socio-economic rights, attention to implementation of judgments is essential. A strong normative base for such judgments is just as crucial, …


An Introduction To Social Choice, Maxwell L. Stearns Mar 2009

An Introduction To Social Choice, Maxwell L. Stearns

Maxwell L. Stearns

Social choice studies the differing implications of the concept of rationality (or transitivity) for individuals versus groups under specified conditions and the significance of these differences in various institutional decision making contexts. This introductory chapter on social choice for the Elgar Handbook on Public Choice (Elgar Publishing Company, Dan Farber and Anne O’Connell, editors), introduces the basic framework of social choice, considers the implications of social choice for various legal and policy contexts, and provides a framework for evaluating a range of normative proposals grounded in social choice for reforming lawmaking institutions. After a brief introduction, part II introduces the …


The Efficiency Of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, Dan W. Puchniak Mar 2009

The Efficiency Of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, Dan W. Puchniak

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

It is widely assumed that hostile takeovers are a prerequisite for an efficient system of corporate governance. This assumption is false. Since the new millennium, Japan has transformed itself from being on the brink of one of the largest economic meltdowns in modern economic history to currently being in the midst of its longest period of postwar economic expansion (2002-2007). This astounding recovery was achieved without a single successful hostile takeover of a major Japanese company. True to its postwar tradition, corporate Japan has successfully restructured through government intervention, bank-driven reallocation of capital, and orchestrated and friendly mergers — the …


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …


Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern Jan 2009

Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern

GEORGE S FORD

Under Section 629 of the Communications Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt regulations to promote a retail market for set-top boxes. The Commission’s first attempt was the ill-fated CableCard experiment, which—by the Commission’s own admission—was a dismal failure. In response, the Commission is now contemplating an aggressive new “AllVid” regime, whereby the agency would mandate multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”) to provide an adapter to serve as a “common interface for connection to televisions, DVRs, and other smart video devices.” Because the FCC is again proceeding without any formal economic analysis of the nature of the service-equipment relationship in …


The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak Jan 2009

The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak

GEORGE S FORD

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …


On The Efficiency Of Negligence Rule, Satish K. Jain Jan 2009

On The Efficiency Of Negligence Rule, Satish K. Jain

Satish K. Jain

In the law and economics literature there are three different versions of negligence rule which have been discussed. These three versions are: (i) Injurer is liable for the entire loss if negligent, and not liable if nonnegligent. Injurer is negligent if his care level is below the due care level, otherwise nonnegligent. (ii) Injurer is liable for the incremental loss if negligent, and not liable if nonnegligent. Injurer is negligent if his care level is below the due care level, otherwise nonnegligent. (iii) Injurer is liable for the incremental loss if negligent, and not liable if nonnegligent. Injurer is negligent …


Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism On The Slippery Slopes, Mario J. Rizzo Jan 2009

Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism On The Slippery Slopes, Mario J. Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

The “new paternalism” claims that careful policy interventions can help people make better decisions in terms of their own welfare, with only mild or nonexistent infringement of personal autonomy and choice. This claim to moderation is not sustainable. Applying the insights of the modern literature on slippery slopes to new paternalist policies suggests that such policies are particularly vulnerable to expansion. This is true even if policymakers are fully rational. More importantly, the slippery-slope potential is especially great if policymakers are not fully rational, but instead share the behavioral and cognitive biases attributed to the people their policies are supposed …


The Knowledge Problem Of The New Paternalism, Mario J. Rizzo Jan 2009

The Knowledge Problem Of The New Paternalism, Mario J. Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

The “new paternalism” is a set of policy prescriptions based on recent findings in behavioral economics whose purpose is to help individuals overcome a wide variety of behavior and cognitive biases. According to its proponents, it does not aim at replacing the preferences of individuals with those of the paternalist but rather to uncover the “true” preferences of individuals, that is, the preferences they would have if they had perfect knowledge, unlimited cognitive abilities and no lack of willpower. The purpose of this Article is to show that new paternalist policies founder on the shoals of a profound knowledge problem …


The Intersection Of Judicial Attitudes And Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Jeff L. Yates, Elizabeth Coggins Jan 2009

The Intersection Of Judicial Attitudes And Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Jeff L. Yates, Elizabeth Coggins

Jeff L Yates

Two prominent theories of legal decision making provide seemingly contradictory explanations for judicial outcomes. In political science, the Attitudinal Model suggests that judicial outcomes are driven by judges' sincere policy preferences -- judges bring their ideological inclinations to the decision making process and their case outcome choices largely reflect these policy preferences. In contrast, in the law and economics literature, Priest and Klein's well-known Selection Hypothesis posits that court outcomes are largely driven by the litigants' strategic choices in the selection of cases for formal dispute or adjudication -- forward thinking litigants settle cases where potential judicial outcomes are readily …


Del Alambre De Púas Al Gps: La Influencia De La Tecnología En Los Derechos De Propiedad, Enrique Pasquel Jan 2009

Del Alambre De Púas Al Gps: La Influencia De La Tecnología En Los Derechos De Propiedad, Enrique Pasquel

Enrique Pasquel

Este trabajo describe cómo la tecnología ha influido en el desarrollo y la evolución de los derechos de propiedad.


Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden Jan 2009

Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden

Bradley T. Borden

Economies of scale exist if long-run average costs decline as output rises. All else being equal, the decline in average costs should lead to greater profitability, making economies of scale attractive to businesses. Nobel laureate George Stigler recognized that economies of scale should help determine the optimum size of a firm. To obtain economies of scale and optimum firm size, parties may integrate resources or grant access to resources without integrating. Such arrangements create shared economies of scale. Tax law must consider the effects of shared economies of scale and address them. In particular, the varying degrees of scale-sharing raise …


Clitoridectomy And The Economics Of Islamic Marriage And Divorce Law - Ryan M Riegg - 2009, Ryan M. Riegg Jan 2009

Clitoridectomy And The Economics Of Islamic Marriage And Divorce Law - Ryan M Riegg - 2009, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

No abstract provided.


Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg Dec 2008

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

For a long time, economists and investors have been baffled as to why Studios continue to produce movies with "blockbuster"-sized budgets (i.e. movies with budgets over $100 million) when producing those movies expose Studios to considerable economic risk.
By explaining the unique economics of the Film industry, and the effect of the Paramount (antitrust) rules on Film distribution contracts, this article provides an explanation to the puzzle of the blockbuster that is confirmed by recent trends in Film industry. Additionally, by using the Film industry as a model, this article also demonstrates how relational contracting can be understood as a …


Behavioral Economic Issues In American & Islamic Marriage & Divorce Law, Ryan M. Riegg Dec 2008

Behavioral Economic Issues In American & Islamic Marriage & Divorce Law, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

The article critiques traditional economic theory, which frequently fails to address issues like "trust" in the forming of both contractual and marital relationships, and addresses problems within both the American and Islamic marriage & divorce systems from a behavioral economic, and comparative, perspective.


What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin Dec 2008

What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

One of the reasonable motivations for voting is that one vote can make a difference, as Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan [2007] showed. In a presidential election, the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your state is necessary for an electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied in that event. We computed these probabilities a week before the 2008 presidential election, using state-by-state election forecasts based on the latest polls. The states where a single vote was most likely to matter are New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado, …


One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, Michael W. Carroll Dec 2008

One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, Michael W. Carroll

Michael W. Carroll

The United States and its trading partners have adopted cultural and innovation policies under which the government grants one-size-fits-all patents and copyrights to inventors and authors. On a global basis, the reasons for doing so vary, but in the United States granting intellectual property rights has been justified as the principal means of promoting innovation and cultural progress. Until recently, however, few have questioned the wisdom of using such blunt policy instruments to promote progress in a wide range of industries in which the economics of innovation varies considerably.

Provisionally accepting the assumptions of the traditional economic case for intellectual …