Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Structuring And Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role Of Seniority, Patrick Bolton, Olivier Jeanne

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show, however, that competition for repayment between lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.

The Race To The Center And Other Lessons Of Globalization, Jagdish N. Bhagwati

Faculty Scholarship

An Interview with Kenta Tsuda, New York, NY, 1 June 2006.

]agdish Bhagwati is a professor of economics and law at Columbia University and senior fellow in international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. His publications include The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries and In Defense of Globalization. He is the founder of the Journal of International Economics and Economics & Politics.

End Natural Life Sentences For Juveniles, Jeffrey A. Fagan

Faculty Scholarship

In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons (125 S. Ct. 1183) banned executions of persons who commit capital murder before they reach age 18. Roper overturned death sentences for 72 people in 18 states (Streib, 2005). Most (but not all) were resentenced to natural life or life in prison without the possibility of parole (or JLWOP). Juvenile justice advocates now want to extend Roper’s maturity heuristic, proportionality analysis, aversion to errors, and deference to international laws and norms to argue for a constitutional ban on natural life sentences for adolescent offenders. This move could have a far …

To Condone Or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions In The Absence Of Security Council Authorization, Monica Hakimi

Faculty Scholarship

The U.N. Charter establishes that regional arrangements may not take enforcement actions without authorization from the Security Council. Yet the international community does not always enforce this Charter rule. Major international actors repeatedly tolerate deviations from it even as they assert that it allows no exceptions. This Article examines that practice, arguing that two different legal systems govern enforcement actions taken by regional arrangements. One system is reflected in the Charter text and publicly endorsed by major international actors. The second, more nebulous system is based on expectations and demands in the absence of Security Council authorization. Under this second …