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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Labor Economics

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

2024

Employer market power

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

How Major Tech Firms Used Illegal “No-Poach” Agreements To Control Workers’ Salaries, Matthew Gibson Apr 2024

How Major Tech Firms Used Illegal “No-Poach” Agreements To Control Workers’ Salaries, Matthew Gibson

Employment Research Newsletter

No abstract provided.


How Major Tech Firms Used Illegal “No-Poach” Agreements To Control Workers’ Salaries, Matthew Gibson Apr 2024

How Major Tech Firms Used Illegal “No-Poach” Agreements To Control Workers’ Salaries, Matthew Gibson

Upjohn Institute Policy and Research Briefs

No abstract provided.


Employer Market Power In Silicon Valley, Matthew Gibson Mar 2024

Employer Market Power In Silicon Valley, Matthew Gibson

Upjohn Institute Working Papers

Adam Smith alleged that employers often secretly combine to reduce labor earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: illegal no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other’s workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-difference design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 5.6 percent, consistent with considerable employer market power. Stock bonuses and job satisfaction were also negatively affected.