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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Trade, Competitiveness And Employment In The Global Economy, Susan Houseman
Trade, Competitiveness And Employment In The Global Economy, Susan Houseman
Susan N. Houseman
No abstract provided.
On The Pro-Trade Effects Of Immigrants, Massimiliano Bratti, Luca De Benedictis, Gianluca Santoni
On The Pro-Trade Effects Of Immigrants, Massimiliano Bratti, Luca De Benedictis, Gianluca Santoni
Luca De Benedictis
This paper investigates the causal effect of immigration on trade flows using Italian panel data at the province level. We exploit the exceptional characteristics of the Italian data (the fine geographical disaggregation, the very high number of countries of origin of immigrants, the high heterogeneity of social and economic characteristics of Italian provinces, and the absence of cultural or historical ties) coupled with the use of a wide set of fixed effects and an `instrument' based on immigrants' enclaves. We find that immigrants have a significant positive effect on both exports and imports, but much larger for the latter. The …
Can A Unilateral Carbon Tax Reduce Emissions Elsewhere?, Joshua Elliott, Don Fullerton
Can A Unilateral Carbon Tax Reduce Emissions Elsewhere?, Joshua Elliott, Don Fullerton
Don Fullerton
One country or sector that tries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may fear that other countries or sectors will get a competitive advantage and increase emissions. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models such as Elliott et al (2010a,b) indicate that 15% to 25% of abatement might be offset by this “leakage.” Yet the Fullerton et al (2012) simple two-sector analytical general equilibrium model shows an offsetting term with negative leakage. In this paper, we use a full CGE model with many countries and many goods to measure effects in a way that allows for this negative leakage term. We vary elasticities …
Negative Leakage, Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton, Daniel H. Karney
Negative Leakage, Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton, Daniel H. Karney
Kathy Baylis
Our analytical general equilibrium model solves for effects of a small increase in carbon tax on leakage - the increase in emissions elsewhere. Identical consumers buy two goods using income from endowments that are mobile between sectors. Usually an increase in one sector's tax raises output price, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive leakage. Here, we find a new negative effect not recognized in existing literature: the taxes sector substitutes away from carbon into clean inputs, so it may absorb resources, shrink the other sector and reduce their emissions. This "abatement resource effect" could offset some or …
Leakage, Welfare, And Cost-Effectiveness Of Carbon Policy, Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton, Daniel H. Karney
Leakage, Welfare, And Cost-Effectiveness Of Carbon Policy, Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton, Daniel H. Karney
Don Fullerton
We extend the model of Fullerton et al (2012) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage maybe negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.
Slides - Africa In The World Trade Network, Luca De Benedictis
Slides - Africa In The World Trade Network, Luca De Benedictis
Luca De Benedictis
Here you find the slides of the presentation of the paper Africa in the World Trade Network held in Lausanne University at ETSG 2010, September 10th 2010
Africa In The World Trade Network, Luca De Benedictis
Africa In The World Trade Network, Luca De Benedictis
Luca De Benedictis
Openness, Lobbying, And Provision Of Infrastructure, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Joy Mazumder
Openness, Lobbying, And Provision Of Infrastructure, Ujjayant N. Chakravorty, Joy Mazumder
Ujjayant Chakravorty
Casual empirical evidence suggests that infrastructure provision is higher in economies that are open to world trade. We develop a model of imperfect competition to show that open economies are likely to provide more infrastructure than closed economies. If infrastructure is financed by taxing a producer lobby, the open economy will overprovide while the closed economy will underinvest; an open economy approaches optimal provision when this lobby group is small in size. If financing of infrastructure is done by taxing the whole population, the closed-economy outcome may be preferred relative to that of the open economy.
The Trade-Induced Effects Of The Services Directive And The Country-Of-Origin Principle, Roland De Bruijn, Henk Lm Kox, Arjan Lejour
The Trade-Induced Effects Of The Services Directive And The Country-Of-Origin Principle, Roland De Bruijn, Henk Lm Kox, Arjan Lejour
Henk LM Kox