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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.
Testing Oligopolistic And Oligopsonistic Behaviour: An Application To The U.S. Meat-Packing Industry, Azzeddine Azzam, Emilio Pagoulatos
Testing Oligopolistic And Oligopsonistic Behaviour: An Application To The U.S. Meat-Packing Industry, Azzeddine Azzam, Emilio Pagoulatos
Azzeddine Azzam
This paper extends the conjectural approach in industrial organization to the analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets. Starting from the specification of a production function, the econometric analysis is based on the formulation and estimation of a simultaneous-equation model consisting of production function, first-order conditions associated with factor employment, and two conjectural elasticities to parameterize the industry's oligopoly and oligopsony equilibria. As an example, we provide and application to the U.S. meat-packing industry. Our results suggest that the industry exercises market power in both the output (meat) market and the factor (live animal) market.
Problematic Relations: Franchising And The Law Of Incomplete Contracts, Gillian K. Hadfield
Problematic Relations: Franchising And The Law Of Incomplete Contracts, Gillian K. Hadfield
Gillian K Hadfield
This paper explores an alternative approach to the analysis of franchise contracts which takes seriously their unavoidable incompleteness. The point of departure is the fundamental insight of relational contracting theory, namely that when a contract is embedded within an identifiable relationship, such as the franchise relationship, contractual obligations are often modified, supplemented or completely supplanted by the norms of the ongoing relation. Thus far, the explication of this insight has been along largely theoretical lines. My objective in this article is to further develop the theoretical analysis of the importance of relational elements in order to fashion operational guidelines for …