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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Climate Change (1)
- Climate Risks (1)
- Ecological compensation (1)
- Efficiency (1)
- Environmental regulation strategy (1)
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- Evolutionary game theory (1)
- Evolutionary stable strategy (1)
- Fiscal decentralization (1)
- Multi-agent (1)
- Numerical simulation (1)
- Optimal control strategies (1)
- Pollution governance investment (1)
- Return Predictability (1)
- Stochastic differential game (1)
- Stock Market (1)
- Transboundary pollution (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Optimal Control For Transboundary Pollution Under Ecological Compensation: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach, Ke Jiang, Ryan Knowles Merrill, Daming You, Pan Pan
Optimal Control For Transboundary Pollution Under Ecological Compensation: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach, Ke Jiang, Ryan Knowles Merrill, Daming You, Pan Pan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
To account for previously ignored, yet widely observed uncertainty in nature's capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation (EC) regimes, this study constructs a stochastic differential game (SDG) model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region. Equilibrium strategies in the stochastic, two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract. A case-based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights. First, accounting for various random disturbance factors, …
Implementation Of A Multi-Agent Environmental Regulation Strategy Under Chinese Fiscal Decentralization: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach, Ke Jiang, Daming You, Ryan Knowles Merrill, Zhendong Li
Implementation Of A Multi-Agent Environmental Regulation Strategy Under Chinese Fiscal Decentralization: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach, Ke Jiang, Daming You, Ryan Knowles Merrill, Zhendong Li
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) provides a powerful tool with which to unpack the interactive strategies of polluting enterprises (PEs), local government regulators (LG), and central government planners (CG) in China. Here, the prevailing institutional system of fiscal decentralization sees regulatory mandates set by the CG and enforced at the LG level. This delegation shapes managers' incentives when deciding the degree to which firms will incur costs to reduce pollution and comply with state directives. Manager's choice sets draw shape from decisions at the LG level, where regulators balance the pursuit of environmental quality with the economic payoffs of tacit collusion …
Climate Risks And Market Efficiency, Harrison Hong, Frank Weikai Li, Jiangmin Xu
Climate Risks And Market Efficiency, Harrison Hong, Frank Weikai Li, Jiangmin Xu
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Climate science finds that the trend towards higher global temperatures exacerbates the risks of droughts. We investigate whether the prices of food stocks efficiently discount these risks. Using data from thirty-one countries with publicly-traded food companies, we rank these countries each year based on their long-term trends toward droughts using the Palmer Drought Severity Index. A poor trend ranking for a country forecasts relatively poor profit growth for food companies in that country. It also forecasts relatively poor food stock returns in that country. This return predictability is consistent with food stock prices underreacting to climate change risks.