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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Meritocracy And Its Discontents: Long-Run Effects Of Repeated School Admission Reforms, Chiaki Moriguchi, Yusuke Narita, Mari Tanaka
Meritocracy And Its Discontents: Long-Run Effects Of Repeated School Admission Reforms, Chiaki Moriguchi, Yusuke Narita, Mari Tanaka
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
What happens if selective colleges change their admission policies? We study this question by analyzing the world’s first implementation of nationally centralized meritocratic admissions in the early twentieth century. We find a persistent meritocracy-equity tradeoff. Compared to the decentralized system, the centralized system admitted more high-achievers and produced more occupational elites (such as top income earners) decades later in the labor market. This gain came at a distributional cost, however. Meritocratic centralization also increased the number of urban-born elites relative to rural-born ones, undermining equal access to higher education and career advancement.
Experiment-As-Market: Incorporating Welfare Into Randomized Controlled Trials, Yusuke Narita
Experiment-As-Market: Incorporating Welfare Into Randomized Controlled Trials, Yusuke Narita
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose a design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM produces a Pareto efficient allocation of treatment assignment probabilities, is asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation, and unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify these properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). In this empirical setting, compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.
Toward An Ethical Experiment, Yusuke Narita
Toward An Ethical Experiment, Yusuke Narita
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard …
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Peter Cramton
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro
Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro
Luciano I. de Castro
Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.
Can Markets Save Lives? An Experimental Investigation Of A Market For Organ Donations, Cary Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough
Can Markets Save Lives? An Experimental Investigation Of A Market For Organ Donations, Cary Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough
ESI Working Papers
Many people die while waiting for organ transplants even though the number of usable organs is far larger than the number needed for transplant. Governments have devised many policies aimed at increasing available transplant organs with variable success. However, with few exceptions, policy makers are reluctant to establish markets for organs despite the potential for mutually beneficial exchanges. We ask whether organ markets could save lives. Controlled laboratory methods are ideal for this inquiry because human lives would be involved when implementing field trials. Our results suggest that markets can increase the supply of organs available for transplant, but that …
Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis Of Farmland Preservation In Maryland, John K. Horowitz, Lori Lynch, Andrew J. Stocking
Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis Of Farmland Preservation In Maryland, John K. Horowitz, Lori Lynch, Andrew J. Stocking
Andrew J Stocking
Policy makers have turned to competition-based voluntary-enrollment programs as a cost-effective way to achieve preferred land uses. This paper studies bidder behavior in an innovative auction-based program in which farmers compete to sell and retire the right to develop their land. We derive a reduced-form bidding model that includes private and common values. This model allows us to estimate the role of bidder competition, winner’s curse correction, and the underlying distribution of private values. We estimate that the auction enrolled as many as 3,000 acres (12%) more than a take-it-or-leave-it offer would have enrolled for the same budgetary cost.
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.
Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton
Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.
The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in …
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose …
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
Peter Cramton
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.
Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton
Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly …
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
Peter Cramton
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents won fewer …
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Colombia’S Forward Energy Market, Peter Cramton
Colombia’S Forward Energy Market, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper presents a market design for Colombia’s forward energy market, which is scheduled to began in 2008. The forward energy market is an organized market to procure energy for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes both the regulated market (residential and other small customers) and the nonregulated market (large customers). Currently, regulated customers represent 68% of the total electricity demand and nonregulated customers represent the remaining 32%. The proposed design is novel in that it integrates both the regulated and nonregulated customers into a single organized market. Although the regulated and nonregulated energy products remain distinct, their …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Affidavit arguing that HQ manipulated the NYISO TCC and day-ahead energy markets. On behalf of DC Energy, LLC.
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.