Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

La Metà Del Cielo Tra Confucio E Mercato, Tonia Warnecke, Alain Blanchard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Women In China, Between Confucius And The Market, Tonia Warnecke, Alain Blanchard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Contractual Approach To Shareholder Oppression Law, Benjamin Means

Faculty Publications

According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in closely held corporations must bargain against opportunism by controlling shareholders before investing. Put simply, you made your bed, now you must lie in it. Yet most courts offer a remedy for shareholder oppression, often premised on the notion that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority or must honor the minority's reasonable expectations. Thus, law and economics, the dominant mode of corporate law scholarship, appears irreconcilably opposed to minority shareholder protection, a defining feature of the existing law of close corporations.

This Article contends that a more nuanced theory of …

The Use Of Securities Data In Determining Discount Rates For Real Property, Hal B. Heaton

Faculty Publications

When the income approach is used to value real property, appraisers forecast anticipated cash flows from the property and discount those cash flows to arrive at a present value. To do this, appraisers must determine an appropriate rate for discounting the future cash flows. Market value is usually defined as the price between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Appraisers therefore should study the market for the type of properties involved to determine the discount rates used by buyers and sellers of those properties in actual transactions.

The Rise And Fall Of Glass-Steagall, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Warren C. Gibson

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham

Faculty Publications

Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.

Positive Economic Freedom: An Enabling Role For International Labor Standards In Developing Countries?, Tonia Warnecke, Alex De Ruyter

Faculty Publications

Approaches to economic development have overemphasized negative economic freedom for multinational corporations at the expense of a majority of the population in developing countries. An inevitable outcome has been the growth of informal sector and “vulnerable” employment in developing countries and entrenchment of existing inequalities. We argue that rather than an emphasis on negative freedom, an emphasis on using labor standards to facilitate positive economic freedom must occur. Labor standards do this not only through the “core” rights of union membership and collective bargaining, but also in addressing substantive (“non-core”) rights at work (wages, working-time, etc.), thereby facilitating positive freedom.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations In The Czech Republic: A Survey Of Municipality Expenditure Patterns, Phillip J. Bryson, Scott M. Smith, Gary C. Cornia

Faculty Publications

A survey of Czech local officials probes perceptions of intergovernmental relations. Perceived autonomy and municipality size are tested as autonomy indicators. The impact of the city size on municipal expenditures from different funding sources is evaluated. Cross-tabulations of city size identify revenue sources for various expenditures and activities. For all expenditures, use of funds is more effectively explained by city size than by the fiscal choices of high- and low-autonomy groups. A graphic analysis of relationships between expenditures and revenue sources complements the statistical analysis. Radar charts reveal sources for small versus large and low- versus high-autonomy cities.

Government’S Diminishing Benefits From Inflation, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Intellectual Property And Antitrust Limits On Contract: Comment, Matthew J. Holian, Neil Nguyen

Faculty Publications

In their chapter in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (2001, Cambridge University Press), Burtis and Kobayashi never defined their model's discount rate, making replicating their simulation results difficult. Through our own simulations, we were able to verify their results when using a discount rate of 0.10. We also identified two new types of equilibria that the authors overlooked, doubling the number of distinct equilibria in the model.

The Persistence Of Accounting Versus Economic Profit, Matthew J. Holian, Ali M. Reza

Faculty Publications

Drawing on Schumpeterian theory, this article presents estimates of a first-order autoregressive model of profit persistence for large US firms, using Economic Value Added (EVA), the popular measure of profits produced by Stern Stewart and Company, and simple (unadjusted) accounting measures from the Compustat database. We hypothesize about the differences we should expect to find between these two sets of estimates, and also provide a fresh normative assessment of the dynamic competitiveness of the US economy.

Understanding The M-Form Hypothesis, Matthew J. Holian

Faculty Publications

The theory of the firm deserves to play a prominent role in both the undergraduate and graduate industrial organization curriculum, both because of the vast amount of attention that has been paid to this area over the last four decades, as well as its practical relevance for strategy and antitrust. This lecture briefly presents some background on the theory of the firm in general, and the M-form Hypothesis in particular. The M-form Hypothesis is an important theory of firm structure, developed by Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975). A mathematical model, discussion section and accompanying lecture slides illustrate the concepts necessary …

Corporate Social Responsibility In Emerging Markets - The Importance Of The Governance Environment, Marc Fetscherin, Shaomin Li, Ilan Alon, Christoph Lattemann, Kuang Yeh

Faculty Publications

• This study examines how country-level, industry-level, and firm-level factors affect the extent of corporate communication about CSR in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). In particular, using the data of 105 largest MNCs from BRIC, we investigate the CSR motives, processes, and stakeholder issues discussed in corporate communications.
• On the country level, we use a newly developed framework of the governance environment which differentiates between rule-based and relation-based governance. Our study reveals that the governance environment of a country is the most important driving force for the communication intensity about CSR.
• Our results show that firms communicating …

Tao Of Downfall: The Failures Of High-Profile Entrepreneurs In The Chinese Economic Reform, Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon

Faculty Publications

Through historical reviews and case studies, this research seeks to understand why some initially successful entrepreneurs failed in the economic boom of past decades. Among various factors contributed to their downfalls are a unique political and business environment, fragile financial systems, traditional cultural influences and personal characteristics. Notwithstanding that these factors should be further tested through empirical studies, those high-profile entrepreneurs are oblivious but essential actors in the grand theatre of China's economic transformation and their failures have contributed to the swift development of the Chinese entrepreneurship over the last 30 years.