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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Economics

2010

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Dynamic auctions and mechanisms

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey, Dirk Bergemann, Maher Said Mar 2010

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey, Dirk Bergemann, Maher Said

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.


Dynamic Auctions: A Survey, Dirk Bergemann, Maher Said Mar 2010

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey, Dirk Bergemann, Maher Said

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.